# 1NC- Cap K

## Com Cap

### 1NC K

#### The aff participates in an economy of communicative capitalism by which the circulation of information turns our activity into passivity. It trades off with critical energy toward revolution.

[personal communications such as anger, demands, and desparation for answers to questions that we do not know. the content of what we say is not important. communication serves capital interests, whether in affective forms of care for producers and consumers, or sharing and expression of instruments for human relations]

Dean 12 (Jodi, political philosopher and professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “The Communist Horizon”, Verso 2012)

Communication technologies contribute to the displacement and dispersion of critical energy such that even as inequality has intensified, forming and organizing a coherent opposition has remained a persistent probl em-and this in a setting lauded for the way it provides everyday people with new capacities for involvement. Participatory media is personalizing media, not only in the sense of surveillance and tracking but also in the sense of the injunction to find out for oneself and share one's opinion. Ubiquitous personal communications media turn our activity into passivity, capturing it and putting it into the service of capitalism. Angry, engaged, desperate to do something, we look for evidence, ask questions, and make demands. Yet the information we need to act seems perpetually out of reach; there is always something we misunderstand or do not know. The astronomical increases in information that our searching, commenting, and participating generate entrap us in a setting of communication without communicability. As contributions to circuits of information and affect, our utterances are communicatively equivalent; their content, their meaning, is unimportant. On a blog, for example, gibberish written by an automated bot is as much a comment as any thoughtful reflection. The specific contribution has no symbolic efficiency; rather, it marks only the fact of its having been made. This decline in a capacity to transmit meaning, to symbolize beyond a limited discourse or immediate, local context, characterizes communication's reconfiguration into a primarily economic form. It produces for circulation, not use. As Hardt and Negri argue in Empire, communication "is the form of capitalist production in which capital has succeeded in submitting society entirely and globally to its regime."8 Having become production, communication flows and circulates with little to no regard for transmitting meaning. Channeled through cellular networks and fiber-optic cables, onto screens and into sites for access, storage, retrieval, and counting, communication merges with the capitalist circuits it produces and amplifies. Capitalist productivity derives from its expropriation and exploitation of communicative processes. This does not mean that information technologies have replaced manufacturing; in fact, they drive a wide variety of mining, chemical, and biotechnological industries. Nor does it mean that networked computing has enhanced productivity outside the production of networked computing itself. Rather, it means that capitalism has subsumed communication such that communication does not provide a critical outside. Communication serves capital, whether in affective forms of care for producers and consumers, the mobilization of sharing and expression as instruments for "human relations" in the workplace, or contributions to media circuits. 9 Marx's analysis of value in Capital helps explain how communication can be a vehicle for capitalist subsumption. Value, for Marx, derives from the social character of labor. What is common to different kinds of human labor is that they are all labor in the abstract, components of the larger homogeneous mass of human labor. Products of labor are "crystals of this social substance, common to them all," that is to say, values. 10 Communicative capitalism seizes, privatizes, and attempts to monetize the social substance. It doesn't depend on the commodity-thing. It directly exploits the social relation at the heart of value. Social relations don't have to take the fantastic form of the commodity to generate value for capitalism. Via networked, personalized communication and information technologies, capitalism has found a more straightforward way to appropriate value

#### Their call for a ballot is to breathe life into the system that consumes all beings for dead labor which is turned on its head for more and more production – resistance is a site for power to exert itself in as a symptom of desire.

Bifo 11 – (Franco “Bifo” Berardi, *After the Future* pg 106-108)

Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

#### Capitalism faces a unique moment of structural crisis– the impact is unprecedented structural violence and extinction – 5 warrants – that turns the aff.

ROBINSON 14 (William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate trans- national circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis. Structural crises reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than finan- cial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimen- sions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our con- sciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of social reproduction. The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of hegemony and domi- nation. National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, un- employment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hege- monic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of world- wide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustain- ability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending col- lapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of human- ity I mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth. This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evo- lutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by pur- posive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of sig- nificance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ru- ralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has in- tensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison- industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction.

Timeframe

Consensus – author references “leading environmental scientists”

Particularity – the unique structural nature of the crisis means their old evidence won’t apply

Internal probability – their impact authors will hedge with qualifiers like “maybe” or “possibly” – Robinson is very explicit and sure that cap will cause extinction

#### Vote neg to endorse the communist party. Engaging in an organized struggle against global dispossession is the only coherent politics under communicative capitalism. Their atomized fantasies of resistance are re-absorbed and disperse critical energy.

**Dean 16** (Jodi, political philosopher and professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “Crowds and Party”, Verso 2016)

“For justice thunders condemnation”

How do and can we imagine political change under the conditions of communicative capitalism? Is political change just aggregated personal transformation, communism as viral outbreak or meme-effect, #fullcommunism? Do we think that autonomous zones of freedom and equality will emerge like so many mushrooms out of the dregs left behind in capital flight and the shrinking of state social provisioning? Or do we optimistically look to democracy, expecting (all evidence to the contrary) that communism, or even upgraded social democracy, will arise out of electoral politics? All these fantasies imagine that political change can come about without political struggle. Each pushes away the fact of antagonism, division, and class struggle as if late neoliberalism were not already characterized by extreme inequality, violence, and exploitation, as if the ruling class did not already use military force, police force, legal force, and illegal force to maintain its position. Politics is a struggle over power. Capital uses every resource—state, non-state, interstate—to advance its position. A Left that refuses to organize itself in recognition of this fact will never be able to combat it. In communicative capitalism, individual acts of resistance, subversion, cultural production, and opinion expression, no matter how courageous, are easily absorbed into the circulatory content of global personal media networks. Alone, they don’t amplify; they can’t endure. They are easily forgotten as new content rushes into and through our feeds. We indulge in fantasies of the freedom of our expression, our critical edge and wit, disavowing the way such individuated freedom is the form of collective incapacity. Against states and alliances wielded in the service of capital as a class, diverse and separate struggles are so many isolated resistances, refusals to undertake the political work of pulling together in organized, strategic, long-term struggle. The constant churn of demands on our awareness disperses our efforts and attention. What the Left should be doing is coordinating, consolidating, and linking its efforts so that they can amplify each other. We don’t need multiple, different campaigns. We need an organized struggle against capitalism capable of operating along multiple issues in diverse locations. Crowds push back. From the perspective of the party, we see them as the insistent people. Fidelity to the insistence of the egalitarian discharge demands that we build the infrastructure capable of maintaining the gap of their desire. The more powerful the affective infrastructure we create, the more we will feel its force, interiorizing the perspective of the many into the ego-ideal that affirms our practices and activities and pushes us to do more than we think we can. Radical pluralists and participatory democrats sometimes imply that there can be a left politics without judgment, 153 condemnation, exclusion, and discipline. Denying the way that collective power works back on those who generate it, they suggest we can have the benefits of collectivity without its effects. But “working back” is an inextricable dimension of collectivity’s capacity to cut through the self-interest of individual needs and produce enduring bonds of solidarity. Collective activities always have effects in excess of their immediate goals. Rather than fearing these effects, rather than remaining stuck in the fantasy that an individual can change the world, and rather than remaining so gripped by fears of power that we fantasize a politics that can abolish it, we should confront the force of collectivity directly and take responsibility for generating it and using it. The party capable of building an affective infrastructure that can cut through the barriers of capitalist expectation will err. It is not, cannot be, and should not be believed to be infallible. Sometimes it may turn its immense energies on itself. If we can’t bear it, we aren’t the Left, the communists, we need. Anyone who is unwilling to talk about the party should not talk about political transformation.

### 1NC- Berkeley

#### Academic spaces are built on social death—the affirmative’s in-round activism only replicates this institutional violence—we been convinced by the myth that our discourse shapes the material, when that myth is spoon-fed to us by the powerful to keep our movements pacified and co-opted

The classroom manages our social death and translates what we once knew from high school, family life itno acceptable forms of social conflict.

Civic life itself (electoral campaigns, student body, pr officials) has a ton of social death.

They try to coopt the movement over night, and funnelingit into the electoral process, they look forward to these battles

Whenever we think that we are being activist and pushing boundaries- those boundaries push back

The university is designed to obscure and decay us- but it's also a factory.

The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes

**Occupied UC Berkeley 9**

Occupied UC Berkeley. “The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death, and the UC.” November 18th, 2009. https://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/

Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls.

#### The aff’s academic method has zero solvency—seeking radical futures within spaces like debate is always already limited, destined to perpetuate commodification and oppression—the alternative is to endorse an antagonistic opposition toward the repressive institution of debate

Every group that we design is given it's own burial point- we are given limited spaces of recognition-

These instittios don't are for our independent values

The institution is a site for commodified identities and the state's monopoloy on violence

**Occupied UC Berkeley 9**

Occupied UC Berkeley. “The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death, and the UC.” November 18th, 2009. https://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/

There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot. Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned. Social rupture is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a function of war. War contains the ability to create a new frame, to build a new tension for the agents at play, new dynamics in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war. It is November 2009. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures and self-propelled, unmanaged movements of wild bodies. We need, we desire occupations. We are an antagonistic dead. Talk to your friends, take over rooms, take over as many of these dead buildings. We will find one another.

### 1NC- Berlant

#### Productivity is a fantasy -- the promise of debate keeps us working within a liberal institution, wasting our time in this place that can’t change the world. The more we think debate can do something for us, the more the fantasy grows and the crueler the relationship of optimism will be.

[when we desire something, we talk about the promises that we want someone to make to us or something that we embed in an institution.

there is a cruel optimism when we realize that we don't actually have our object of desire, we lose our attachment to it and it ruins our sense of what it means to keep being in the world. what the actual fuck is this card]

**Berlant 2007** Lauren Berlant “Cruel Optimism: On Marx, Loss and the Sense” 33-36

When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about **a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us** and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea - whatever. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. **In other words, all attachments are optimistic**. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form. In optimism, **the subject leans toward promises contained within the** present moment of the **encounter with their object**.' 'Cruel optimism' names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility **whose realisation is discovered either to be impossible**, sheer fantasy, **or** too possible, and **toxic**. What's cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though **its presence threatens their well-being**, because whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of **what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world**. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. **Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object**. One more thing: the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is, I think, usually something an analyst observes about someone's or some group's attachment to x, since usually that attachment exists without being an event, or even better, seems to lighten the load for someone/some group.^ But if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone/some group, even in disavowed fashion, the fear is that the loss of the object/scene of promising itself will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see below. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But **some scenes of optimism are** clearly **crueller than others**: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising or animating potency of an object/ scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. To understand cruel optimism, therefore, one must embark on an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into an enabling object **that is also disabling**. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought. In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening.' But the condition of projected possibility, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining) **creates a fake present moment of intersubjectivity** in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is made possible by the fantasy of you, laden with the x qualities I can project onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but it is actually a turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under the condition, and illusion, that the two is really (in) one. Apostrophe **is thus an indirect, unstable, physically impossible but phenomenologically vitalising movement** of rhetorical animation that permits subjects to suspend themselves in the optimism of a potential occupation of the same psychic space of others, the objects of desire who make you possible (by having some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that the conditions of the lush submerging of one consciousness into another **require a double negation**: of the speaker's boundaries, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire; and of the spoken of, who is more or less a powerful mute placeholder providing an opportunity for the speaker's imagination of her/his/their flourishing. Of course **psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible**. It is a wish, a desire, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition - recognition is the misrecognition you can bear, **a transaction that affirms you without**, again, **necessarily feeling** **good** or accurate (it might idealise, it might affirm your monstrosity, it might mirror your desire to be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving - spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may have not to become significantly different." In short, Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended intersubjectivity demand from the reader. What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics, aesthetics, and projections of political depression. Political depression persists in affective judgments of the world's intractability - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on - modes of what might be called **detachment that are really not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" The politically depressed position is manifested in the problem of the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work, and which indeed make obstacles to the desires that animate them**; my archive tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast." **Cruel optimism** **is**, then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as **an analytic lever** it is an incitement to inhabit and **to track the** affective **attachment to what we call 'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless**, and at the same time, **find their conditions of possibility within it**. My assumption is that the conditions of ordinary life in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US, are conditions of the attrition or the wearing out of the subject, and that the irony - that the labour of reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^ Cruel optimism is in this sense a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence, one that grows from a perception about **the reasons people** are not Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but **choose to ride the wave of the system of attachment that they are used to**, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, **and** to **misrecognise that** promise **as an achievement**. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and provide tools for suggesting why **these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is**, after all, **a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out** by the promises that they have attached to in this world.

## Links

### Genealogy Link

#### Genealogy as a method with mere potentiality as its end fragments resistance to multinational capitalism.

Resch 92 (Robert Paul, Associate Professor of History at Texas A&M University, “Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory”, University of California Press 1992)

In contrast to its fraternal twin, dissident postmodernism revels in the obstreperous rhetoric of political rebellion. Revealing and resisting the spontaneous generation and diffusion of "power" throughout society, dissident postmodernists, such as Michel Foucault, claim to have discovered the only form of radicalism appropriate for defending "freedom" in "postindustrial" society. However, postmodern dissidence purchases its radical credentials at a high cost. By abandoning allegedly "totalitarian" global analysis for fragmentary "genealogies" of particular social phenomena, postmodern rebels end up hypostatizing both the "power" they resist and the "freedom" they defend. Even less willing to admit the economic taproot of power and domination than were their forerunners in the New Left, dissident postmodernists attempt to resist power on an ad hoc basis—everywhere, in all forms, and all at once. Ultimately such resistance collapses under the magnitude of its task and the futility of its method. At the point of exhaustion, postmodern dissidents capitulate to the greater wisdom of their cynical and accommodating counterparts. In the end, "resist everything" is merely the flip side of "anything goes." If everything is bad, it is not long before bad begins to look, if not exactly good, at least irresistible. The domestication of dissident postmodernism in the eighties (the shift of Lyotard and Foucault from gauchisme to "Americanism" are only more serious examples of a general phenomenon parodied by the career of Baudrillard) substantiates Fredric Jameson's contention that postmodernism reflects, rather than critiques, "the cultural logic" of multinational capitalism. The short-lived predominance of postmodern dissidence during the seventies deserves further study. I suggest, provisionally, that dissident postmodernism has functioned as the loyal opposition during the birth pangs of multinational capitalism and in this respect has been simply the ideological obverse of the New Right. The anti-Marxist or post-Marxist rhetoric of postmodernism is obviously crucial in this regard. The more blatant the effects of economic determination and class struggle became during the seventies and eighties, the more stubbornly they were denied by postmodern theorists. Indeed, a large part of what is left of the New Left has rationalized its crushing defeat by blaming it on traces of Marxism still at work within the radical movement and its social theory.

### Aesthetics Link

#### Framing their 1AC as an aesthetic encounter ultimately fails. The avant-garde is co-opted by capitalism and the impact is a new wave of military and economic domination.

Jameson 91 (Fredric, Knut Schmidt-Nielsen Professor of Comparative Literature and Romance Studies (French) and the director of the Center for Critical Theory at Duke University, “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism”, from “Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism”, Duke UP 1991, <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~drbr/jameson/jameson.html>, accessed 7/13/16)

Consider, for example, the powerful alternative position that post-modernism is itself little more than one more stage of modernism proper (if not, indeed, of the even older romanticism); it may indeed be conceded that all the features of postmodernism I am about to enumerate can be detected, full-blown, in this or that preceding modernism (including such astonishing genealogical precursors as Gertrude Stein, Raymond Roussel, or Marcel Duchamp, who may be considered outright postmodernists, avant la lettre). What has not been taken into account by this view, however, is the social position of the older modernism, or better still, its passionate repudiation by an older Victorian and post-Victorian bourgeoisie for whom its forms and ethos are received as being variously ugly, dissonant, obscure, scandalous, immoral, subversive, and generally "antisocial." It will be argued here, however, that a mutation in the sphere of culture has rendered such attitudes archaic. Not only are Picasso and Joyce no longer ugly; they now strike us, on the whole, as rather "realistic," and this is the result of a canonization and academic institutionalization of the modern movement generally that can be traced to the late 1950s. This is surely one of the most plausible explanations for the emergence of postmodernism itself, since the younger generation of the 1960s will now confront the formerly oppositional modern movement as a set of dead classics, which "weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living;" as Marx once said in a different context. As for the postmodern revolt against all that, however, it must equally be stressed that its own offensive features-from obscurity and sexually explicit material to psychological squalor and overt expressions of social and political defiance, which transcend anything that might have been imagined at the most extreme moments of high modernism-no longer scandalize anyone and are not only received with the greatest complacency but have themselves become institutionalized and are at one with the official or public culture of Western society.

What has happened is that aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity production generally: the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation. Such economic necessities then find recognition in the varied kinds of institutional support available for the newer art, from foundations and grants to museums and other forms of patronage. Of all the arts, architecture is the closest constitutively to the economic, with which, in the form of commissions and land values, it has a virtually unmediated relationship. It will therefore not be surprising to find the extraordinary flowering of the new postmodern architecture grounded in the patronage of multinational business, whose expansion and development is strictly contemporaneous with it. Later I will suggest that these two new phenomena have an even deeper dialectical interrelationship than the simple one-to-one financing of this or that individual project. Yet this is the point at which I must remind the reader of the obvious; namely, that this whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and terror.

### Communication Link

#### Communicative capitalism co-opts liberatory discourse. Only the alternative’s hardline seizure of division and insistence on revolution can escape the circuit.

Dean 12 (Jodi, political philosopher and professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “The Communist Horizon”, Verso 2012)

At the same time, however, the very communicative practices capitalism drives and exploits entrap us in circuits from which escape seems impossible: participation is personalization; the more we communicate, the less is communicated; expansions in expression and creativity produce the one rather than a collective of the many. The challenge, then, consists in breaking with current practices by insisting on and intensifying the division of and in the common. Continuing in the flow, persisting in the repetitions of drive, we over and over reconstitute capitalism's basic dynamic, perhaps generating "the possibility of another organization of social life" but also and at the same time hindering "that possibility from being realized."29 Capitalism demands change, permanent revolution, crisis. Born out of opposition to planning, neoliberalism in particular tluives on shock and emergency, converging yet again with communicative capitalism in its mode of spectacle. To persist in the practices through which communicative capitalism exploits the social substance, then, is to fail to use division as a weapon on behalf of a communist project. Division is common. We have to seize it.

### Fragmenting Link

#### The 1AC’s focus on individual performances disconnects politics from the collective class struggle. Creating no material change, the aff wallows in self-satisfaction to the backdrop of climate disaster and capitalist exploitation. Communism is a better world and requires mobilization.

Dean 12 (Jodi, political philosopher and professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “The Communist Horizon”, Verso 2012)

Instead of a politics thought primarily in terms of resistance, playful and momentary aesthetic disruptions, the immediate specificity of local projects, and struggles for hegemony within a capitalist parliamentary setting, the communist horizon impresses upon us the necessity to abolish capitalism and to create global practices and institutions of egalitarian cooperation. The shift in perspective the communist horizon produces turns us away from the democratic milieu that has been the fmm of the loss of communism as a name for left aspiration and toward the reconfiguration of the components of political struggle-in other words, away from general inclusion, momentary calls for broad awareness, and lifestyle changes, and toward militant opposition, tight organizational forms (pa1ty, council, working group, cell), and the sovereignty of the people over the economy through which we produce and reproduce ourselves. Some might object to my use of the second-person plural "we" and "us"-what do you mean "we"? This objection is symptomatic of the fragmentation that has pervaded the Left in Europe, the U K, and North America. Reducing invocations of "we" and "us" to sociological statements requiting a concrete, delineable, empirical referent, it erases the division necessary for politics as if interest and will were only and automatically attributes of a fixed social position. We-skepticism displaces the performative component of the second-person plural as it treats collectivity with suspicion and p1ivileges a fantasy of individual singularity and autonomy. I write "we" hoping to enhance a partisan sense of collectivity. My break with conventions of w1iting that reinforce individualism by admonishing attempts to think and speak as part of a larger collective subject is deliberate. The boundaries to what can be thought as politics in certain segments of the post-structuralist and anarchist Left only benefit capital. Some activists and theorists think that micropolitical activities, whether practices of self-cultivation or individual consumer choices, are more important loci of action than large-scale organized movement-an assumption which adds to the difficulty of building new types of organizations because it makes thinking in terms of collectivity rarer, harder, and seemingly less "fresh." Similarly, some activists and theorists treat aesthetic objects and creative works as displaying a political potentiality missing from classes, parties, and unions. This aesthetic focus disconnects politics from the organized struggle of working people, making politics into what spectators see. Artistic products, whether actual commodities or commodified experiences, thereby buttress capital as they circulate political affects while displacing political struggles from the streets to the galleries. Spectators can pay (or donate) to feel radical without having to get their hands dirty. The dominant class retains its position and the contradiction between this class and the rest of us doesn't make itself felt as such. The celebration of momentary actions and singular happenings-the playful disruption, the temporarily controversial film or novel-works the same way. Some on the anarchist and post-stmcturalist Left treat these flickers as the only proper instances of a contemporary left politics. A pointless action involving the momentary expenditure of enormous effort-the a11istic equivalent of the 5k and lOk runs to fight cancer, that is to say, to increase awareness of cancer without actually doing much else-the singular happening disconnects task from goal. Any "sense" it makes, any meaning or relevance it has, is up to the spectator (perhaps with a bit of guidance from curators and theorists). Occupation contrasts sharply with the singular happening. Even as specific occupations emerge from below rather than through a coordinated strategy, their common form-including its images, slogans, terms, and practices-links them together in a mass struggle. The power of the return of communism stands or falls on its capacity to inspire large-scale organized collective struggle toward a goal. For over thirty years, the Left has eschewed such a goal, accepting instead liberal notions that goals are strictly individual lifestyle choices or social-democratic claims that history already solved basic problems of distribution with the compromise of regulated markets and welfare statesa solution the Right rejected and capitalism destroyed. The Left failed to defend a vision of a better world, an egalitarian world of common production by and for the collective people. Instead, it accommodated capital, succumbing to the lures of individualism, consumerism, competition, and privilege, and proceeding as if there really were no alternative to states that rule in the interests of mru·kets. Marx expressed the basic principle of the alternative over a hundred years ago: from each according to ability, to each according to need. This principle contains the urgency of the struggle for its own realization. We don't have to continue to live in the wake of left failure, stuck in the repetitions of crises and spectacle. In light of the planetru-y climate disaster and the ever-intensifying global class war as states redistribute wealth to the rich in the name of austerity, the absence of a common goal is the absence of a future (other than the ones imagined in post-apocalyptic scenarios like Mad Max). The premise of communism is that collective determination of collective conditions is possible, if we want it.

### Melancholia Link

#### The 1AC is trapped in its own melancholia – part of a left that satisfies itself with insulated criticism to mask the guilt of having abandoned the proletariat struggle.

Dean 12 (Jodi, political philosopher and professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “The Communist Horizon”, Verso 2012)

An emphasis on the drive dimension of melancholia, on Freud's attention to the way sadism in melancholia is "turned round upon the subject's own self," leads to an interpretation of the general contours shaping the Left that is different from Brown's. Instead of a Left attached to an unacknowledged orthodoxy, we have one that has given way on the desire for communism, betrayed its historical commitment to the proletariat, and sublimated revolutionary energies into restorationist practices that strengthen the hold of capitalism. This Left has replaced commitments to the emancipatory, egalitarian struggles of working people against capitalism -commitments that were never fully orthodox, but always ruptured, conflicted, and contested-with incessant activity (like the mania Freud associates with melancholia) and so now satisfies itself with criticism and interpretation, small projects and local actions, particular issues and legislative victories, art, technology, procedures, and process. It sublimates revolutionary desire to democratic drive, to the repetitious practices offered up as democracy (whether representative, deliberative, or radical). Having already conceded to the inevitably of capitalism, it noticeably abandons "any striking power against the big bourgeoisie," to return to Benjamin's language. For such a Left, enjoyment comes from its withdrawal from responsibility, its sublimation of goals and responsibilities into the branching, fragmented practices of micropolitics, self-care, and issue awareness. Perpetually slighted, harmed, and undone, this Left remains stuck in repetition, unable to break out of the circuits of drive in which it is caught, unable because it enjoys them. Might this not explain why such a Left confuses discipline with domination, why it forfeits solidarity in the name of an illusory, individualist freedom that continuously seeks to fragment and disrupt any assertion of collectivity and the common? The watchwords of critique within this structure of left desire are moralism, dogmatism, authoritarianism, and utopianism, watchwords enacting a perpetual self-surveillance: has an argument, position, or view inadvertently risked one of these enors? Even some of its militants reject party and state, division and decision, securing in advance an inefficacy sure to guarantee it the nuggets of satisfaction that drive provides. If this Left is rightly described as melancholic-and I agree with Brown that it is-then its melancholia derives from the real existing compromises and betrayals inextricable from its history, its accommodations with reality, whether of nationalist war, capitalist encirclement, or so-called market demands. Lacan teaches that, like Kant's categorical imperative, the super-ego refuses to accept reality as an explanation for failure. Impossible is no excuse-desire is always impossible to satisfy. A wide spectrum of the contemporary Left has either accommodated itself, in one way or another, to an inevitable capitalism, or taken the practical failures of Marxism-Leninism to require the abandonment of antagonism, class, and revolutionary commitment to overtuming capitalist arrangements of property and production. Melancholic fantasy-the communist Master, authoritarian and obscene-as well as sublimated, melancholic practices-there was no altemative-shield this Left, shield us, from confrontation with guilt over such betrayal as they capture us in activities that feel productive, important, radical. Perhaps I should use the past tense here and say "shielded" because it seems more and more that the Left has worked or is working through its melancholia. While acknowledging the incompleteness of psychoanalysis's understanding of melancholia, Freud notes nonetheless that the unconscious work of melancholia comes to an end as "each single struggle of ambivalence" loosens "the fixation of the libido to the object" and the object is "abandoned as useless."22 Freud's reference to "each single struggle of ambivalence" suggests that the repetitive activities I've associated with drive and sublimation might be understood more dialectically, that is, not merely as the form of accommodation but also as substantive practices of de- and reattachment, unmaking and making. Mladen Dolar and Slavoj Zizek emphasize this destructive dimension of the drive, the way its repetitions result in a clearing away of the old so as to make a space for the new. 2:l ln a setting marked by a general acceptance of the end of communism and of particular political-theoretical pursuits in ethics, affect, culture, and ontology, a Left described in terms of its melancholic structure of desire may make less sense than a Left that doesn't exist at all. Brown's essay would then be a contribution to the working through and dismantling of left melancholia. In its place, multiple practices and patterns circulate within an academic-theoretical enterprise already subsumed within communicative capital ism. Some of the watchwords of anti-dogmatism remain, but their charge is diminished, replaced by more energetic attachment to new objects of inquiry and interest. The drive shaping melancholia, in other words, is a force of loss as it turns round, fragments, and branches. Over time, as its process, its failure to hit its goal, is repeated, satisfaction attains to this repetition and the prior object, the lost object of desire, is abandoned. For example, some theorists today find the analytic category of the subject theoretically uninteresting, essentially useless; they've turned instead to objects, locating there new kinds of agency, vitality, and even politics. The recent reactivation of communism also bears witness to the end of melancholia as a stmcture of left desire. Describing the massive outpouring of enthusiasm for the 2009 London conference on the idea of communism, Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Zizek note that the question and answer sessions were "good-humored and non-sectarian," a clear indication "that the period of guilt is over."24 Even more pronounced is the movement against capitalism at work in 2011's Arab spring, European summer, and US fall. Globally, occupations put to work an insistent collectivity that struggles toward a new assertion of the common and commons. Is it possible to understand this reactivation of communism in terms of desire, and if so, in what sense? I think that it is. In the next section, I defend two theses: first, communist desire designates the subjectification of the gap necessary for politics, the division within the people; second, this subjectification is collective-our desire and our collective desire for us.

### Identity Link

#### Attachment to identity is pathological and reactive, turns us inward, and disillusions us to the possibility of sustainable futures.

**Dean 16** (Jodi, political philosopher and professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “Crowds and Party”, Verso 2016)

The saturation of the generic political identity of the working class became manifest in the multiplication of political identities. From 1968’s intoxication with the politics of the beautiful moment, through the eighties’ embrace of civil society and the politics of society’s own self-targeting, into the “activistism” and “movementism” of the alterglobalization movement, the Left has claimed as a victory the symptom of its defeat: the erosion of working-class political power and the accompanying decay of its political parties. Defeated on the political plane—the name of this defeat is “neoliberalism”—the Left shifted to the social and cultural terrain. It fragmented into issues and identities. On some issues and with respect to some identities, there were political advances. At the same time, in jettisoning the struggle for political power, the Left lost the capacity to defend and advance the interests of the people. Economic inequality increased. Commitment to social provisioning—education, public housing, welfare, social services 158 —collapsed. Identity as an operator for a politics is now itself fully saturated. Symptoms of this saturation include the reduction of the space of change to the individual, the circulation of the momentary outrage in the affective networks of communicative capitalism, the practices of calling out and shaming that undermine solidarity, and the contradictory and destructive attachment to national and ethnic specificity. They include as well the complex mutual policing of who can claim what identity under what conditions and what authorizes such a claim. When identity is all that is left, hanging on to it makes a kind of sense. The reality of the struggle to survive becomes the basis of an identity imagined as dignified because it has to produce itself from itself. Attachment to identity is pathological, nevertheless. It enchains us to collective failure, turning us ever inward as it holds back the advance of a politics capable of abolishing the current system and producing another one. Unfettered capitalism and the repressive state constitute real limits to cultural critique and social experimentation: exploitation, dispossession, incapacitation, incarceration, proletarianization, extermination. Perhaps the most striking symptom of the saturation of identity is thus the economic rupturing of identity categories, that is to say, the emergence of identities as themselves sites of class struggle. In 2014 and 2015, riots in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland pushed this struggle into mainstream discussions in the US

### Survival Strategies Link

#### Survival strategies fragments mass movements into a totality of atomized individuals, each struggling to survive, rendered reactive to dominant hierarchy. Their liberation is an illusion and only collective search for material transformation can solve.

Papantonopoulou 14 (Saffa, Anthropology and Middle East Studies Dual PhD, “Even a Freak Like You Would Be Safe in Tel Aviv”: Transgender Subjects, Wounded Attachments, and the Zionist Economy of Gratitude”, WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly 42: 1 & 2 (Spring/Summer 2014), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/549603/summary, accessed 7/18/16)

Wendy Brown’s words ring just as true today as they did twenty years ago when they were written. While Brown did not explore what, exactly, mobilizes wounded attachments, what we have seen since 1993 is an increase in the deployment of wounded attachments by neoliberalism and neocolonialism. The Zionist economy of gratitude, as part of a multibillion-dollar propaganda industry, is an economy in a very literal sense. Pinkwashing deploys preexisting tropes of Jewish victimization inherent to Zionism, in an attempt to hail the transgender subject into a debt of gratitude toward neoliberalism. This narrative deploys vulnerability as economic capital, and its historical rise coincides with a tactical and discursive shift by radical and progressive politics within the West. This shift has been a move toward hyperindividualized projects of semiotic and representational interventions into existing systems. This is encapsulated in the assump- tion that through better (media) representation, and precisely defined terminologies, transgender people and other oppressed people may find liberation. The renaturalization of capitalism within late twentieth-century identity politics is both a product of and produced by the reframing of both temporality and the individual’s relation to the collective within purportedly liberatory political projects. No longer part of a mass movement that aims toward liberation of the collective in historical time, we are instead relegated to a totality of atomized individuals, each struggling to survive. The struggles for survival are very much real, but the ways in which they have been politicized—even more, the ways in which survival within the existing system has become the political project—reflect an internalization of Margaret Thatcher’s infamous quip “There is no alternative.” We are often grappling with subjectivities that have been produced by disciplinary regimes in order not to survive. Liberation will mean the ceasing-to-be of many of these disciplined subjectivities. And there are few things more terrifying than calling for the death of one’s own subject position. But this may be the point where it makes sense to part from Brown, as Brown parts from Nietzsche. After all, Brown does not account for movements—such as, say, the Black Panther Party, to name one example—that politicized identity as part of a liberatory project, avoiding both liberal co-optation and crude Marxist reductionism. Rather than focus further on Brown’s notion of wounds and traumas, it may be useful to reevaluate Fanon’s notion of catharsis in the twenty-first century. What might we imagine a transgender catharsis could look like? To Fanon, catharsis happens as part of decolonial struggle, which is, in his words, “an agenda for total disorder. But it cannot be accomplished by the wave of a magic wand . . . or a gentleman’s agreement.” Fanon specifies that decolonial struggle “is an historical process” (1963, 2). Liberation, catharsis, and healing from trauma will not happen on the level of a matrix of individuals, or a more precise regime of signification, and no theoretical intervention (even on the part of this text) will bring it into being. Again, we cannot signify our way toward liberation as something that happens in historical time; we cannot make a priori promises of safety or security. There is unfortunately no predicting what, exactly, a historical unraveling of a violent system may bring about. But we can, at the very least, prepare ourselves, by critically examining what sort of political tropes we reproduce in attempting to name our pain. Demanding liberation in historical time, through a collec- tive struggle that places more weight on the material than on the semiotic or symbolic, while simultaneously allowing geocultural cross-pollination of ideas and signifiers without a historically deterministic search for “origins” (Foucault 1977), may allow us to break out of cycles of debt and gratitude. But this change will not happen through theoretical intervention alone; it must happen through a structural and material transformation of the world we live in.

#### Survival strategies fail

Subotnik 98 – Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. 7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681

Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly.

An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74

"Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti cles. n76 Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. n77

[\*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [\*697] It is because ofthis conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.

If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the rightand ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications  [\*698]  for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

### BLM Link

Dean 16 (Jodi, political philosopher and professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “Crowds and Party”, Verso 2016)

Since Badiou’s 2006 interview, there has been renewed left interest in the party form. This interest results from the impasses encountered by the crowds and riots in the latter half of the decade. In cities all over the world, hundreds and thousands of people took to the streets and parks in a resounding “no” to the array of policies installed by the capitalist class to protect its interests. These protests signaled a new militancy and determination on behalf of opponents of austerity, precarity, state violence, and the neoliberal mantra of cuts, cuts, cuts. Then the protests ended. The crowds went home. Sometimes they made no demands. Other times they made impossible demands. And still other times they asserted truths both obvious and painful in the urgency of their assertion: Black Lives Matter.

The press of these crowds presents an alternative to Badiou’s “identity that is beyond identity.” The alternative is movement itself, the force of many where they don’t belong, the intensity of the egalitarian discharge. Marx and Engels link socialism not simply to the identity of the working class. They link it to working-class movement. In the nineteenth century, worker uprisings were pushing forward, coming together, and breaking out, disrupting capital processes of value extraction. This active movement incited Marx and Engels (and other nineteenth-century socialists and anarchists) to see in proletarian struggle more than demands for shorter working days, safer working conditions, and higher wages. They saw these struggles as the political process of the subject of communism. We can repeat their innovation not by looking for a generic identity (a search that already preoccupied Marcuse and returns in another form in Hardt’s and Negri’s multitude) but by emphasizing movement. In place of the saturation of identity, we should turn to the process of movement, recognizing the people as the subject of that process. The very fact of the active aggregation of crowds, the rise of 159 political opposition and militancy, directs us to a collective desire for collectivity.

The crowds and riots of the last decade have shown us the many coming to sense their collective power, the capacity of number to inscribe a gap in the expected. Debt, immiseration, policing, and dispossession have incited those proletarianized under communicative capitalism to revolt. Global demonstrations have also brought to the fore the crowd’s limitation. Its powers are destructive, creative, unpredictable, contagious, and temporary. The strength that comes with the indeterminacy of the crowd’s message is a weakness when the crowd disperses. The crowd lacks capacities of endurance, implementation, and execution. Without mediation, that is to say, absent a transferential relation to another space, it doesn’t know what it desires. The crowd doesn’t have a politics. It is the opportunity for a politics

### Affect Link

#### Affect = Neoliberal Bliss

Reber ’12 (Dierdra, Assistant Professor of Latin American Culture @ Emory U., “Headless Capitalism: Affect as Free-Market Episteme” Differences, Vol. 23.1, pp. 81-83)

It is not only the eradication of obstacles to its diffusion that marks the global capitalism of the post-Soviet period, but also the simultaneous development of a technology in the form of the World Wide Web that accomplished the realization—and reactivation—of its inherent originary potentialities.7 Regarding the historical convergence between the emergence of the web and the triumph of neoliberalism, new media studies critic Lev Manovich has the following meditation: Although causally unrelated, conceptually it makes sense that the end of [the] Cold War and the design of the Web took place at exactly the same time. The first development ended the separation of the world into parts closed off from each other, making it a single global system; the second development connected [the] world’s computers into a single network. The early Web (i.e., before it came to be dominated by big commercial portals toward the end of the 1990s) also practically implemented a radically horizontal, non-hierarchical model of human exis- tence in which no idea, no ideology, and no value system can dominate the rest—thus providing a perfect metaphor for a new post–Cold-War sensibility. (25) There may be no causal relation between the end of the Cold War and the launching of the World Wide Web—or at least no single cause—but we might ask ourselves whether new media technology (the web and its mechanisms of massive intercommunicativity) emerge in satisfaction of the dictates of capitalist needs. Manovich’s characterization of the web as “implement[ing] a radically horizontal, non-hierarchical model of human existence in which no idea, no ideology, and no value system can dominate the rest” is a concise paraphrasis of the epistemic fundaments of capitalist homeostasis. In this sense, Manovich’s identification of the web as a “perfect metaphor for a new post–Cold War sensibility” invites the interpretation of new media technology as a vehicle to realize on a virtual plane the structure and operation of the affective monosubject—the homeostatic feeling soma. In media and cultural studies discourse, the network has emerged as a signal trope of global capital (Castells; Dyer- Witheford; Fisher; Latour) and, from the perspective of affective epistemicity, the material realization of its discursive body. That is, Manuel Castells’s “network society” “made of networks in all the key dimensions of social organization and social practice” (xviii) is no more or less than the manifest architectonic rendering of the infinitely capacious soma guided by Smith’s invisible hand—with the fact that this architecture is now virtual as well as physical only increasing the girth and expanse of the collective capitalist subject. It is in this context that we have witnessed the explosion of affect in every field of knowledge, most strikingly within the natural sciences, which had for two centuries endured and thwarted, as the last bastion of epistemic reason, the incursions of affect. Suddenly, in the post-Soviet era, the flirtations with the scientific study of affect that had begun in the post–World War II era of u.s. economic, military, and cultural preeminence exploded in scale. Now, well into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the cutting edge of research in each of the three major disciplines is, in some way, an inquiry into affect, whether physiological or discursive, empirical or representational, material or symbolic. Contemporary culture and politics likewise reflect this discursive shift in the same measure that free-market capitalism—neoliberalism, in its most contemporary iteration—has achieved unprecedented heights of both hegemony and contestation. It may be that the development of new-media network culture affords capitalism with the technological realization of its epistemologically idealized homeostatic structure causing its discourse of growth comparatively to wane, but its practice does not cease to be what Weber called “identical with the pursuit of profit” (5). The global neoliberal variant of capitalism presents a paradox. On the one hand, the ideological and technological circumstances are such that capitalism’s epistemologically affective discourse can come to the fore virtually unchallenged, confront- ing the problem of conversion—from markets to epistemologies—rather than any problem of competition. On the other hand, this very condition of global hegemony allows neoliberal capitalism to take its practice of profit-making to unprecedented heights of neocolonialism of a vertigi- nous divide between a tiny global elite and the heterogeneous masses.8 Where capitalist apologies maintain that such radical asymmetry—and the poverty and social injustice that accompany it—are accidental, David Harvey argues that they are structural—the “raison d’être” of the system as opposed to a mere “side-product” (98). Hence neoliberalism hits upon capitalism’s greatest and most persistent difficulty: the reconciliation of its practical telos of profit (growth) with its epistemic self-portrait of harmony (homeostasis). For in theory, the sprouting of a monarchical—colonialist—“head” constitutes the most powerful allegation of immoral hypocrisy that could be leveled against capitalism in its revolutionary iteration, because it strikes at the core of the capitalist discourse of epistemic affect itself, which staunchly maintains an ethic of headlessness—the sovereign self-regulation of the body, by the body.9

### Micro-ethics Link

#### Micro-ethics are merely a new term for infinite, individual consumption which is recuperated back into capitalist modes of production. We need to adopt macro-ethics against capitalism that can subvert this failed belief otherwise extinction.

Thompson ‘12 (Stacey, Associate Professor in the English Department at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, “THE MICRO-ETHICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE” Cultural Studies, pp. 21-24)

As a final concept for grasping today’s popular and dominant ethics in the USA, consider Hegel’s notion of the ‘beautiful soul’ and the temptation to occupy its space. Is it not an earlier name for micro-ethics? Hegel (1977) describes it:

[The beautiful soul] lives in dread of besmirching the splendour of its inner being by action and an existence; and, in order to preserve the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with the actual world, and persists in its self- willed impotence to renounce its self which is reduced to the extreme of ultimate abstraction. (p. 400)

In bloggerspeak, such a subject is called a ‘purity troll’, the name for someone who dismisses any proposal for social change as always-already fatally compromised. In the beautiful soul, we encounter a similar rejection of collective action. By re-using towels, shopping at Target and buying fair trade coffee at Starbucks, the beautiful soul, paradoxically, establishes an alibi for him- or herself. He or she feels justified in saying:

Look how busy I am! While it is true that my micro-ethics has effected no significant change, has no apparent impact, is, in fact, completely ineffectual, it is still clear that I am doing all that I can. No one could possibly ask me to do more. I am doing my part!

This exacting and delimited attention to one’s own part allows one to preserve oneself as a ‘beautiful soul’ that presupposes its own inability to act effectively in a larger context. In other words, the ‘beautiful soul’ falls back upon maintaining the individual self’s beauty and simultaneously abandons or gives up on any larger intervention, the possible ‘beauty’ of collective action, for instance.

In psychoanalytic terms, the micro-ethicist is behaving precisely as a neurotic, someone with an obsessional neurosis. The obsessional neurotic struggles unrelentingly, is always busy, can never have a moment to sit and think. Why? Paradoxically, not to produce change but to avoid it. He or she repeats rituals not to make something happen 􏰀 to put an end to factory farming, to save the world’s water supply 􏰀 but to prevent such events from happening, to prevent genuine change and thereby to avoid having to deal with it. It is not that the Target shopper wants current farming practices or capitalist exploitation to continue. The problem is not that simple. Rather, the compulsive behaviour stands in, at the level of the Imaginary and the individual ego, for a more difficult engagement with the systemic problem and the Symbolic Order. The obsessive behaviour reassures us that we are doing what we can, that we need not take the next difficult step. This ‘next step’ would involve thinking through the social problem with others and bringing about a new response to it, a social rather than individual one, an intervention in the Symbolic Order rather than the expansion of a fantasy in the Imaginary. The compulsive behaviour and frenetic busy-ness prevents, in Lacan’s terms (1997), the profound encounter of a subject’s desire with the Real from occurring, the brush against the limits of knowledge that inspires an Act that has the potential to reshape the field of knowledge itself. In other words, micro-ethics blocks the new possibility from emerging, the one that cannot be thought within the field of knowledge, that is the Symbolic Order. Yet, this emergence of the new, this brush with the Real, is exactly what needs to occur if we are effectively to oppose the logic of the global economy itself.5

As Gilbert (2008) writes, we ‘now live in an era when, throughout the capitalist world, the overriding aim of government economic policy is to maintain consumer spending levels’. Yet, two things are increasingly clear in the ‘capitalist world’ (which is the world). First, production and consumption need to decrease radically if the planet’s biosphere is to be maintained. Second, periodic crises like the one that began in 2008 might be avoidable within a new economic framework 􏰀 some form of planned economy. In spite of the efforts of the ethico-rhetoric of our time to position problems of ecology and labour within the realm of globalized capitalism, I do not believe that we can consume our way out of our problems with overconsumption, not even through more efficient or just consumption.6 Nor can we produce our way out of our overproduction. Rather, framing climate change and exploitation as problems for the consumer is not merely a misunderstanding on the part of capitalism but its enabling blind spot. For capitalism to continue functioning, it must not be able to perceive or represent to itself the effects or meanings of its own functioning, not unlike the individual and his or her Imaginary relationship to the Symbolic Order and his or her meaning within it. The individual can never believe, at the level of the Imaginary, that he or she is not essential to the functioning of the Symbolic Order itself. In other words, maintaining myself as an individual requires that I never apprehend myself as a more-or-less meaningless object within the signifying network that is the Symbolic Order; I cannot afford an ‘objective’ view of myself that would situate me as just another person among the over six billion on earth, whose sudden disappearance would not rend the social fabric itself. Instead, I perceive myself as the (Imaginary) central force of the world that cathects the objects around it and thereby invests them with meaning. In parallel fashion, capitalism cannot grasp, within the terms of capitalism itself (its own Imaginary), what capitalism means Symbolically.

It is difficult to find a better example of capitalism’s internal incapacity to grasp catastrophes of its own making, and especially climate change, than in its response to global warming in Greenland. A recent New York Times Magazine article comments that Greenland’s:

real promise lies in what may be found under the ice. Near the town of Uummannaq, about halfway up Greenland’s coast, retreating glaciers have uncovered pockets of lead and zinc. Gold and diamond prospectors have flooded the island’s south. Alcoa is preparing to build a large aluminum smelter. The island’s minerals are becoming more accessible even as global commodity prices are soaring. And with more than 80 percent of the land currently iced over, the hope is that the island has just begun to reveal its riches . . . The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Greenland’s northeastern waters could contain 31 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and gas. On the other side of the island, the waters separating it from Canada could yield billions of barrels more. And while Greenland is still considered an oil exploration frontier, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Canada’s Husky Energy and Cairn Energy and Sweden’s PA Resources are already ramping up exploration.

(Faris 2008)

In this fascinating 􏰀 but not isolated 􏰀 example, we encounter, in an extreme and, therefore, pure form, the structure and function of capitalist ideology. What is remarkable about the capitalist response (that of Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Husky Energy, etc., although also the US Geological Survey’s response) to the warming of Greenland is the multinational corporations’ structural incapacity to register climate change as anything but another opportunity for capitalist expansion. Even though, as the article quoted above begins by explaining, in near-apocalyptic language:

Greenland’s ice sheet represents one of global warming’s most disturbing threats. The vast expanses of glaciers \* massed, on average, 1.6 miles deep \* contain enough water to raise sea levels worldwide by 23 feet. Should they melt or otherwise slip into the ocean, they would flood coastal capitals, submerge tropical islands and generally redraw the world’s atlases. The infusion of fresh water could slow or shut down the ocean’s currents, plunging Europe into bitter winter.

(Faris 2008)

But from the perspective of capitalism’s Imaginary view of the world, its internal logic, these catastrophic effects within the Symbolic Order are structurally invisible. Rather, they register for capitalism as new possibilities instead of catastrophes, as new opportunities for expanding markets into hitherto dead zones in terms of profit and the accumulation of wealth.

I have attempted to argue, in this article, that we live in a historical moment that is not post-ideological. Instead, our current moment is one in which capitalism imagines itself, both for itself and for its consumers, through the very language of ecology and non-exploitation that has until recently been used to critique it (‘community’, ‘eco-consumption’, ‘non-exploited labour’). I have also attempted to draw a parallel between the psychoanalytic subject’s Imaginary incapacity to grasp itself as an object within the Symbolic Order and capitalism’s inability to do the same, to separate its internal logic of necessary expansion, exploitation and growth from the often-catastrophic effects that these processes have upon the world external to capitalist profit and expansion. But I want to conclude with the hope that, while capitalism cannot ‘objectify’ itself in order to engage in self-critique, we, in cultural studies, are still external enough to capitalism to vigorously criticize its fantasies about itself and thereby help maintain the possibility of a ‘world’ external to the capitalist Imaginary.

### Lifestyle Anarchism Link

#### The aff’s politics are little more than lifestyle anarchism in black: affirmation of mystery, refusal of political engagement which becomes a model for rich liberal boys to evade complicity in violence. Instead of affirming mystery and play, you should endorse the difficult and boring labor of committed social transformation by voting neg

Bookchin ‘95 (Murray, great man, *SOCIAL ANARCHISM OR LIFESTYLE ANARCHISM: AN UNBRIDGEABLE CHASM*)

Like the petty-bourgeois Stirnerite ego, primitivist lifestyle anarchism allows no room for social institutions, political organizations, and radical programs, still less a public sphere, which all the writers we have examined automatically identify with statecraft. The sporadic, the unsystematic, the incoherent, the discontinuous, and the intuitive supplant the consistent, purposive, organized, and rational, indeed any form of sustained and focused activity apart from publishing a 'zine' or pamphlet – or burning a garbage can. Imagination is counterposed to reason and desire to theoretical coherence, as though the two were in radical contradiction to each other. Goya's admonition that imagination without reason produces monsters is altered to leave the impression that imagination flourishes on an unmediated experience with an unnuanced 'oneness.' Thus is social nature essentially dissolved into biological nature; innovative humanity, into adaptive animality; temporality, into precivilizatory eternality; history, into an archaic cyclicity.

A bourgeois reality whose economic harshness grows starker and crasser with every passing day is shrewdly mutated by lifestyle anarchism into constellations of self-indulgence, inchoateness, indiscipline, and incoherence. In the 1960s, the Situationists, in the name of a 'theory of the spectacle,' in fact produced a reified spectacle of the theory, but they at least offered organizational correctives, such as workers' councils, that gave their aestheticism some ballast. Lifestyle anarchism, by assailing organization, programmatic commitment, and serious social analysis, apes the worst aspects of Situationist aestheticism without adhering to the project of building a movement. As the detritus of the 1960s, it wanders aimlessly within the bounds of the ego (renamed by Zerzan the 'bounds of nature') and makes a virtue of bohemian incoherence.

What is most troubling is that the self-indulgent aesthetic vagaries of lifestyle anarchism significantly erode the socialist core of a left-libertarian ideology that once could claim social relevance and weight precisely for its uncompromising commitment to emancipation – not outside of history, in the realm of the subjective, but within history, in the realm of the objective. The great cry of the First International -- which anarcho-syndicalism and anarchocommunism retained after Marx and his supporters abandoned it -- was the demand: 'No rights without duties, no duties without rights.' For generations, this slogan adorned the mastheads of what we must now retrospectively call social anarchist periodicals. Today, it stands radically at odds with the basically egocentric demand for 'desire armed,' and with Taoist contemplation and Buddhist nirvanas. Where social anarchism called upon people to rise in revolution and seek the reconstruction of society, the irate petty bourgeois who populate the subcultural world of lifestyle anarchism call for episodic rebellion and the satisfaction of their ‘desiring machines,’ to use the phraseology of Deleuze and Guattari.

The steady retreat from the historic commitment of classical anarchism to social struggle (without which self-realization and the fulfillment of desire in all its dimensions, not merely the instinctive, cannot be achieved) is inevitably accompanied by a disastrous mystification of experience and reality. The ego, identified almost fetishistically as the locus of emancipation, turns out to be identical to the 'sovereign individual' of laissez-faire individualism. Detached from its social moorings, it achieves not autonomy but the heteronomous 'selfhood' of petty-bourgeois enterprise.

Indeed, far from being free, the ego in its sovereign selfhood is bound hand and foot to the seemingly anonymous laws of the marketplace – the laws of competition and exploitation – which render the myth of individual freedom into another fetish concealing the implacable laws of capital accumulation.

Lifestyle anarchism, in effect, turns out to be an additional mystifying bourgeois deception. Its acolytes are no more 'autonomous' than the movements of the stock market, than price fluctuations and the mundane facts of bourgeois commerce. All claims to autonomy notwithstanding, this middle-class ‘rebel,’ with or without a brick in hand, is entirely captive to the subterranean market forces that occupy all the allegedly ‘free’ terrains of modern social life, from food cooperatives to rural communes.

Capitalism swirls around us – not only materially but culturally. As John Zerzan so memorably put it to a puzzled interviewer who asked about the television set in the home of this foe of technology: 'Like all other people, I have to be narcotized.'[37]

That lifestyle anarchism itself is a ‘narcotizing’ self-deception can best be seen in Max Stirner's *The Ego and His Own*, where the ego's claim to 'uniqueness' in the temple of the sacrosanct 'self' far outranks John Stuart Mill's liberal pieties. Indeed, with Stirner, egoism becomes a matter of epistemology. Cutting through the maze of contradictions and woefully incomplete statements that fill The Ego and His Own, one finds Stirner's 'unique' ego to be a myth because its roots lie in its seeming 'other' – society itself. Indeed: 'Truth cannot step forward as you do,' Stirner addresses the egoist, 'cannot move, change, develop; truth awaits and recruits everything from you, and itself is only through you; for it exists only – in your head.'[38] The Stirnerite egoist, in effect, bids farewell to objective reality, to the facticity of the social, and thereby to fundamental social change and all ethical criteria and ideals beyond personal satisfaction amidst the hidden demons of the bourgeois marketplace. This absence of mediation subverts the very existence of the concrete, not to speak of the authority of the Stirnerite ego itself – a claim so all-encompassing as to exclude the social roots of the self and its formation in history.

Nietzsche, quite independently of Stirner, carried this view of truth to its logical conclusion by erasing the facticity and reality of truth as such: 'What, then, is truth?' he asked. 'A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically.' [39] With more forthrightness than Stirner, Nietzsche contended that facts are simply interpretations; indeed, he asked, 'is it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretations?' Apparently not, for 'even this is invention, hypothesis.' [40] Following Nietzsche's unrelenting logic, we are left with a self that not only essentially creates it own reality but also must justify its own existence as more than a mere interpretation. Such egoism thus annihilates the ego itself, which vanishes into the mist of Stirner's own unstated premises.

Similarly divested of history, society, and facticity beyond its own 'metaphors,' lifestyle anarchism lives in an asocial domain in which the ego, with its cryptic desires, must evaporate into logical abstractions. But reducing the ego to intuitive immediacy – anchoring it in mere animality, in the 'bounds of nature,' or in 'natural law' – would amount to ignoring the fact that the ego is the product of an ever-formative history, indeed, a history that, if it is to consist of more than mere episodes, must avail itself of reason as a guide to standards of progress and regress, necessity and freedom, good and evil, and – yes! – civilization and barbarism. Indeed, an anarchism that seeks to avoid the shoals of sheer solipsism on the one hand and the loss of the 'self' as a mere 'interpretation' one the other must become explicitly socialist or collectivist. That is to say, it must be a social anarchism that seeks freedom through structure and mutual responsibility, not through a vaporous, nomadic ego that eschews the preconditions for social life.

Stated bluntly: Between the socialist pedigree of anarcho-syndicalism and anarchocommunism (which have never denied the importance of self-realization and the fulfillment of desire), and the basically liberal, individualistic pedigree of lifestyle anarchism (which fosters social ineffectuality, if not outright social negation), there exits a divide that cannot be bridged unless we completely disregard the profoundly different goals, methods, and underlying philosophy that distinguish them. Stirner's own project, in fact, emerged in a debate with the socialism of Wilhelm Weitling and Moses Hess, where he invoked egoism precisely to counterpose to socialism. 'Personal insurrection rather than general revolution was [Stirner's] message,' James J. Martin admiringly observes [41] – a counterposition that lives on today in lifestyle anarchism and its yuppie filiations, as distinguished from social anarchism with its roots in historicism, the social matrix of individuality, and its commitment to a rational society.

The very incongruity of these essentially mixed messages, which coexist on every page of the lifestyle 'zines,' reflects the feverish voice of the squirming petty bourgeois. If anarchism loses its socialist core and collectivist goal, if it drifts off into aestheticism, ecstasy, and desire, and, incongruously, into Taoist quietism and Buddhist self-effacement as a substitute for a libertarian program, politics, and organization, it will come to represent not social regeneration and a revolutionary vision but social decay and a petulant egoistic rebellion. Worse, it will feed the wave of mysticism that is already sweeping affluent members of the generation now in their teens and twenties. Lifestyle anarchism's exaltation of ecstasy, certainly laudable in a radical social matrix but here unabashedly intermingled with 'sorcery,' is producing a dreamlike absorption with spirits, ghosts, and Jungian archetypes rather than a rational and dialectical awareness of the world.

Characteristically, the cover of a recent issue of Alternative Press Review (Fall 1994), a widely read American feral anarchist periodical, is adorned with a three-headed Buddhist deity in serene nirvanic repose, against a presumably cosmic background of swirling galaxies and New Age paraphernalia – an image that could easily join Fifth Estate's 'Anarchy' poster in a New Age boutique. Inside the cover, a graphic cries out: 'Life Can Be Magic When We Start to Break Free' (the A in Magic is circled) – to which one is obliged to ask: How? With what? The magazine itself contains a deep ecology essay by Glenn Parton (drawn from David Foreman's periodical Wild Earth) titled: 'The Wild Self: Why I Am a Primitivist,' extolling 'primitive peoples' whose 'way of life fits into the pre-given natural world,' lamenting the Neolithic revolution, and identifying our 'primary task' as being to ''unbuild' our civilization, and restore wilderness.' The magazine's artwork celebrates vulgarity – human skulls and images of ruins are very much in evidence. Its lengthiest contribution, 'Decadence,' reprinted from Black Eye, melds the romantic with the lumpen, exultantly concluding: 'It's time for a real Roman holiday, so bring on the barbarians!'

Alas, the barbarians are already here – and the 'Roman holiday' in today's American cities flourishes on crack, thuggery, insensitivity, stupidity, primitivism, anticivilizationism, antirationalism, and a sizable dose of 'anarchy' conceived as chaos. Lifestyle anarchism must be seen in the present social context not only of demoralized black ghettoes and reactionary white suburbs but even of Indian reservations, those ostensible centers of 'primality,' in which gangs of Indian youths now shoot at one another, drug dealing is rampant, and 'gang graffiti greets visitors even at the sacred Window Rock monument,' as Seth Mydans reports in The New York Times (March 3, 1995).

Thus, a widespread cultural decay has followed the degeneration of the 1960s New Left into postmodernism and of its counter'culture into New Age spiritualism. For timid lifestyle anarchists, Halloween artwork and incendiary articles push hope and an understanding of reality into the ever-receding distance. Torn by the lures of 'cultural terrorism' and Buddhist ashrams, lifestyle anarchists in fact find themselves in a crossfire between the barbarians at the top of society in Wall Street and the City, and those at its bottom, in the dismal urban ghettoes of Euro-America. Alas, the conflict in which they find themselves, for all their celebrations of lumpen lifeways (to which corporate barbarians are no strangers these days) has less to do with the need to create a free society than with a brutal war over who is to share in the in the available spoils from the sale of drugs, human bodies, exorbitant loans -- and let us not forget junk bonds and international currencies.

### Anthropolitics Link

#### Their politics gets coopted into a new niche market for capitalist investment, dooming the movement

Gunderson 11 (Ryan, Prof. @ Michigan State U., “From Cattle to Capital: Exchange Value, Animal Commodification, and Barbarism,” Critical Sociology, pp. 11)

Ironically, the same juggernaut that mutilates billions of animals a year has provided animal rightists with a kinder and gentler niche-market. Faux meats and cruelty-free cosmetics adorn (high-income) neighborhood supermarket shelves. The idea of bloodless flesh itself brings to mind Slavoj Žižek’s (2004: 400) conception of the ‘paradoxical structure’ of the ‘chocolate laxative’, or ‘a product con- taining the agent of its own containment’ (decaf coffee, non-alcoholic beer, fatless cream, etc.). Postmodern capitalism’s self-indulgence attempts to synthesize carnality and self-discipline, which allows animal rightists to consume fatless soap, turkey-less ‘Tofurky’, chicken-less nuggets, cow- less burgers, skinless leather, etc. – commodities that immaculately contain ‘the agent of [their] own containment’. As *Time* recently announced, the ‘vegetarian world is buzzing’ about how scientists at the University of Missouri announced that after more than a decade of research, they had created the first soy product that not only can be flavored to taste like chicken but also breaks apart in your mouth the way chicken does: not too soft, not too hard, but with that ineffable chew of real flesh. (Cloud, 2010) Of course these are only minor examples with the intent of illustrating how a movement can be recuperated into accepting the larger, structural ‘chocolate laxative’: a cruelty-free capitalism*.7* The commodification and co-option of the animal rights movement allows its activists to consume their identities as a pseudo-political achievement (see Ashley, 1997: 220–22). That is, many animal rightists are enchanted by the newly ‘revolutionized’ ‘means of consumption’ (Ritzer, 2005) rather than pushing to revolutionize the means of production(i.e. a push for a plant-based, sustainable agriculture). There is nothing unique about the ‘vote with your fork’ perspective in animal protection circles (Imhoff, 2010). It dominates the environmental movement (see Heartfield’s [2008] analysis of green consumerism) and other justice movements (e.g. Hudson and Hudson, 2003). ‘Ethical con- sumerism’ is a reflection of bourgeois market ideology that alienated individuals are expected to subscribe to. The problem is that individualist ethical consumerism is not only limited and ineffective in the face of larger socioeconomic forces, but it also halts social justice movements from pursuing radical means of altering society because they have been co-opted. Even Peter Singer, the author of the highly influential, vegetarianism-supporting *Animal Liberation* (Singer, 1975), has recently recognized the limits of individualist ethical consumerism in the face of a constantly expanding production: ‘during the next decade or two, billions of animals will live and die in fac- tory farms, their numbers barely diminished by the slowly growing number of vegans, and their sufferings entirely unaffected by it’ (Singer, 2008: viii). Is this recuperation damaging for the animal protection movement? Not necessarily. If the goal is to live a ‘cruelty-free’ vegetarian *lifestyle,* then no, late capitalism has and will continue to provide niche ‘alternative’ markets, given the demand and money is present. In fact, providing a diverse and excessive range of diverse yet non-essential commodities to shape one’s ‘identity’ is one of the feats late capitalism is very good at (e.g. Bauman, 2007). As Adorno (1978 [1951]: 207) stated, all ‘products, even non-conformist ones, have been incorporated into the distribution- mechanisms of large-scale capital’. If the goal is in fact liberating animals from the dominion of private property, then yes, co-option is a problem – a contradiction which can only be solved through radically restructuring *production,* not a niche area of consumption.

### Irony Link

#### The drive to shock, entertain, disrupt, and subvert the debate space provides modern Capitalism which the lifeblood it requires to sustain itself and the illusion of its inevitability – in contesting the militarized norms of status quo debate, the aff merely replaces it with a less visible but more insidious form of social control.

#### In the immortal words of Pete Townshend,

#### “Meet the new boss / Same as the old boss”

Clark 15 – (2015, John, professor emeritus of Philosophy at Loyola University, teaches for Common Knowledge: The New Orleans Cooperative Education Exchange, and works with the Institute for the Radical Imagination, works on ecological restoration, permaculture, and eco-communitarianism on a 83-acre land project on Bayou La Terre, in the forest of coastal Mississippi, member of the Education Workers' Union of the IWW, “The Spectacle Looks Back into You: The Situationists and the Aporias of the Left,” in *Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics*, pp. 218-20)

A fundamental flaw of the Situationists was their failure to comprehend the ways in which the project of repressive desublimation was revolutionizing late capitalism itself. Of course, they were hardly alone in overlooking what turned out to be the decisive moment of dialectical reversal in 1960s cultural history. However, as aficionados of radical critique they should have learned something from Marcuse's dissection of the process in One-Dimensional Man as early as 1964, and even before that in his brilliant new preface to Eros and Civilization, written in 1961, in both cases, well before the major Situationist works were published. 20 Marcuse described a late capitalist world in which "desublimated sexuality is rampant," and in which "what happens is surely wild and obscene, virile and tasty, quite immoral-and, precisely because of that, perfectly harmless." 21 Harmless, that is, to the hegemony of the system of domination, as addictively and devastatingly noxious as it might be to the personal and collective psyche.

According to the Situationists, the spectacle was creating a stupefying, deadening existence for the great majority, and the world of commodity consumption was becoming increasingly alienating and, above all, boring. Consequently, the masses were always on the verge of awakening from their hypnotic trance. All they needed was to be clued in about how bad the old world was, and that something much more exciting was possible-something like total cultural revolution. But, in fact, the system was in the midst of a transition into the era of acute hyperstimulation. It had no intention of allowing the masses to lapse entirely into socially dangerous and economically unprofitable boredom. It was mastering the trick of overstimulating and overexciting consumers at the same time that it was depressing and boring them. It was also devising a system of mutual reinforcement, a positive feedback loop, between the two social-psychological processes. Moreover, it was at work on developing a vast spectrum of drugs with which to treat (interminably) the resulting diseases and disorders of consumption. It could look forward to the generation of unprecedented profits through such mining of the psyche. Any gratuitous help from radicals, revolutionaries, counterculturalists, and Situationists in preparing the psychical terrain for exploitation was, of course, greatly appreciated.

Failing to understand the imaginary competition, which was enlisting and mobilizing immense forces of liberation in the cause of domination, the Situationists also failed to understand how their own efforts would play a useful role in capitalism's processes of self-transformation, creative adaptation, and more successful colonization of all spheres of human existence. They would perform the function of creating momentarily radicalized "transitional subjects" who would play an important role in accelerating the lagging movement from productionist to consumptionist society. Had they paid attention to Marcuse's more dialectical account of the processes of liberation and pseudo-liberation, they might have considered the possibility, or rather the inevitability, of dialectical reversals, and would have been able to see the necessity of carrying out a radical negation of the negation. 22 As Marcuse warns, "If there is any way in which the emergence of these possibilities [of liberation] could announce itself prior to the liberation, it would be an increase rather than decrease of repression: restraint of repressive de-sublimation." 23 In other words, there must be a conscious, critical practice of rejection of the forms of desublimation offered by the dominant system, which include many that masquerade as forms of rebellion and liberation. The system of domination already owned "freedom," was in the process of appropriating "liberation" in all its forms, and had more than enough spare change to buy up "libertarianism," if this could help promote the latest advances in ideological mystification.

Lacan said to the insurrectionists of May '68, "What you, as revolutionaries, aspire to is a Master. You will have one."24 This might seem to be a rather perversely contrarian diagnosis of revolutionaries who were wholly captivated by the final arrival of the long-awaited assault against all gods and masters. But, in fact, Lacan's assessment was quite to the point on the issue of "mastery," as Zizek explains: "We did get one-in the guise of the post-modern 'permissive' master whose domination is all the stronger for being less visible."25 To put it another way, after an initial moment of reactive revolt, there will either be a radical negation of the negation, or the process will degenerate into a form of regressive negation. There will be a recuperation of the negation. We have yet to see the radical negation of the negation. What we have seen instead is the most diabolical of bargains: the exchange of a Master whom we feared and resented for a Master whom we love and desire.

#### Second, the strategy of ironic parody and play is a static mode of politics incapable of addressing or combating systemic exploitation and oppression.

Ebert 91 – (1991, Teresa, PhD, Professor of English at SUNY-Albany, “Writing in the Political: Resistance (Post)modernism,” Legal Studies Forum, Volume XV, Number 4, pp. 291-303)

The urgent issue at stake in turning postmodern politics from a "post- politics" into a "transformative politics," to my mind, is the issue of difference: how to conceive of difference politically rather than rhetorically or textually, as well as how to rethink "collectivity" in/after "difference." To do so, we first¶ need to distinguish between what I call "ludic postmodernism" and "resistance postmodernism." Ludic postmodernism finds its articulation in the disappear- ance of the transcendental signified, as in such writers as Jacques Derrida, Lyotard and Baudrillard, for whom reality is a theatre of "simulation" marked by the free play of images, disembodied signifiers and the heterogeneity of difference. According to this metanarrative (which denounces metanarratives and denies being a metanarrative), postmodernism does not know historical boundaries - or rather "history" itself becomes a free-floating trace of textuality - thus postmodernity, for ludic postmodernists, is the name of a recurring crisis in the metanarratives of culture, whether in the Renaissance or in the present (see e.g. Goldberg 1986; Rapaport 1983). Postmodernism, for these thinkers, is the mark of a subversive practice that displaces those grand narratives - such as "exploitation" and "emancipation" - that provide the larger frames of intelligibility for culture and legitimate specific constructions of reality.

Ludic postmodernism is best conceptualized as a crisis of the mode of signification, a crisis in which texts constituted by difference can no longer provide reliable knowledge of the real because meaning itself is self-divided and undecidable: the access of the signifier to the signified is delayed and deferred, divided by a difference within. Ludic postmodernism emphasizes this traffic of differance as dividing and dispersing all cultural practices - including "politics." Thus politics and its foundations, for ludic postmodernists, are traversed by differance, making them self-divided, dispersed and unreliable. This movement of differance deprives politics of its groundedness in such categories of seeming identity, "presence" and plenitude as race, class, gender and state. Moreover, differance dismantles the notion of politics itself as being an "outside" to representation - as a clear, unmediated "referent" for action. Politics, for ludic postmodernists, is instead a textual practice (e.g. parody, pastiche, fragmentation¶ ..)that obscures prevailing meanings: it disrupts the oppressive totality of what Lyotard calls "cultural policy" through "play," "gaming," experimentation in writing and transgressive readings that subvert the "rules" of grand narratives¶ and prevent the easy circulation of meaning in culture (see Lyotard 1984, 6-17, 73-79). Thus radical politics for ludic postmodernists problematizes signifying practices and established meanings, demonstrating that in every entity there is a surplus of meaning - an "excess" - a difference that prevents any given category from being a reliable ground for reality in general and politics in particular. Such a subversive politics of signification is seen as a liberating gesture, deconstructing the totalities - the grand narratives - organizing reality. Ludic postmodernism substitutes a politics of differences within entities for the politics of differences between identities such as race, class and gender.

Ludic postmodernism - whether in poststructuralism or in the pastiche of "styles" in Michael Graves' architecture (see Jencks 1984; Jameson 1988a); Terry Gilliams' film, Brazil; Madonna's videos or Donald Barthelme's fiction (see Ebert 1991a) - is in effect a cognitivism and an immanent critique that reduces politics to rhetoric and history to textuality and in the end cannot provide the basis for a transformative social practice. However, I would argue that we should not easily dismiss it, because it does effectively denaturalize and destabilize the dominant regime of knowledge and the naturalization of the status quo in the common sense. And in problematizing politics it prevents a simple, positivistic practice and calls into question a politics based on essentializing differences between seemingly self-contained and stable identities. But this seems to be all it does: ludic postmodernism removes the ground from under both the revolutionary and the reactionary and in the name of differance effectively conceals radical difference. It does not transform practices; it merely prevents their continuation. Ludic politics is, in the last instance, a Socratic, dialogic, discursive apparatus. It helps to clarify the issues from the perspective of representation, but in doing so, it turns politics into ethics. The issue then for radical politics is how to rewrite the postmodern difference within - differance - not as a ludic difference but as a historical, political difference, a materialized, resisting differance.

#### Third, rendering a decision on the performance of the 1AC drains it of radical potential and ensures that it becomes nothing but a benchmark for the moral evaluation of the traditional debate norms they critique.

Bloom and White 15 – (9/15, Peter, PhD, lecturer in the Department of People and Organisations at the Open University, and Paul, PhD, Senior Lecturer in the School of Management at Swansea University, “The moral work of subversion,” Human Relations, Published Online before Print, Sage Journals)

The moral control of subversion

This analysis has sought to highlight the function of subversion for accomplishing and preserving a moral order. We can now therefore return to our original question, how is it that subversion reflects and reinforces organizational power relations? More precisely, how does the rendering of certain instances of rule-bending as ‘moral’ while others as not ‘moral’ contribute to broader strategies of control? The ad hoc and situated actions undertaken by individuals to navigate an ambiguous organizational context with seemingly conflicting institutional demands must be retrospectively justified as moral. That is, to be considered legitimate such action requires the provision of good reasons and justifications for a particular form of conduct (Garfinkel, 1967). Hence, control lies in the ability to moralize rule-bending, found in the authority granted to make determinations as to which forms of subversion are allowable, for whom and under what conditions (Douglas, 2002 [1966]; Nietzsche, 1996 [1887]). In this regard, moralization not only accomplishes and preserves a moral order, but also the power and forms of control implicit to and arising from this order.

A practice-based account of subversion allows for a reconsideration of the relationship between morality and control. Munro (1999: 634) suggests that the ‘show of control is pivotal to cultural performance’. Crucial here is the understanding that control need not exist in any normative sense, but is wholly a performance that is predicated upon display rather than any link to direct positive action (see Kornberger and Brown, 2007). Rule-bending, in this vein, represents an attempt by subjects to exhibit control in those cultural spaces of ‘in-betweeness’ where they are forced to face the tension of embodying abstract and commonly competing organizational expectations. Control, in turn, is derived from the formal and informal capacity to ‘moralize’ non-moral behaviour as legitimate (see Blau, 1964; Weber, 1978). Specifically, power is associated not with a fixed assumption of what is moral but in the dynamic authority granted to certain actors to authoritatively make such determinations. The performance of a manager in taking a hard line against certain ‘infractions’ or turning a blind eye to others, signifies and reproduces their position of power as a moral arbitrator, thus placing others within his or her institutionally legitimated position of control.

The phenomenon of workplace humour illustrates this relationship. Organizational scholars note that humour can either be a force for employees to subvert managerial authority (Fleming and Sewell, 2002; Rhodes and Westwood, 2007) or a strategy by managers to strengthen the conformity of their workforce (Bolton and Houlihan, 2009; Greatbatch and Clark, 2003; Taylor and Bain, 2003). However, control was also found in the decision-making power granted to managers for determining what was and was not a moral form of subversive humour. Drawing on the example of a call centre, Taylor and Bain (2003) observed that employee telephone agents often made fun of the personal behaviour of team leaders in their daily banter, joking about their tendency to get drunk during the weekend, for instance. This form of subversion was tacitly encouraged by senior management in their call for team leaders to retain their ‘informal contact’ with the agents they supervise, which in practice meant being ‘just part of the gang’. Yet, this subtle deployment of bottom up humour to critique authority was mediated by the ability of managers to set the limits on its propriety. Thus, a joke questionnaire made by staff, and at first approved by team leaders, was soon repressed when employees asked ‘who is going to get the sack before Christmas?’, a question that directly touched upon the pressures managers faced around having to ‘lay off’ temporary staff right before the Christmas holiday.

We would not argue here whether the inclusion of such a question concerning redundancy may or may not be of itself problematic, nor that there were hard and fast rules of appropriateness for place. Crucially, we locate this as a site where control was maintained and the power relations of the organizations reproduced through the performance of the manager’s expanded role as moral arbitrator of acceptable subversion. Indeed, redundancy is transformed here from being a practical demand to one whereby a recognition of such practical demands are transformed into moral means of regulating the proper affective display of the workforce. Kenny and Euchler’s (2012) study of parodying humour within an advertising firm illustrates this point. In this context, the use of humour was always ‘ambiguous’, subverting established identity norms and managerial authority while also having the potential to be used for deepening worker’s commitment to the company and its values. Thus, both managers and employees sent out ‘smutty emails’ creating an organizational order where ‘being funny appeared more important than showing respect or sensitivity for your co-workers and peers, even in accordance with traditional social norms’ (Kenny and Euchler, 2012: 317). Nevertheless, this form of moral subversion reached its limit when a manager stopped jokes directed at the imagined sexual proclivities of his wife.

Significantly, this reproduction of power relations and control through the moralization of subversion is often played out through institutions ostensibly existing to protect employees against the arbitrary judgements of those in authority. Returning to the health care context, it has been reported that both doctors and nurses strategically use institutionally provided accountability systems to ‘scapegoat’ individuals they personally disapprove of as subversive (Cooke, 2006a, 2006b; Hutchinson and Collins, 2004; Pugh, 2011). Analogously, Krueger (1971) documented in her study of a mid-1960s nursing college, that administrators would punish those students considered to be ‘wild’ in their personal behaviour outside the course by evaluating them as merely ‘competent’ clinical nurses compared with their more well behaved ‘good girl’ counterparts, despite the fact that it was generally agreed that the former were superior clinical practitioners (as borne out in their subsequent career). Through this action, the administrators also showed their tacit support of the good girl’s subversion of the ideal of the fully committed nurse in their prioritization of finding a good husband and being a model student over improving their clinical proficiency. Here, the supposedly objective evaluation, one that supposedly neutralized the arbitrary prejudices of those in charge owing to its focus on clinical ability rather than personal character, was in actuality a device to reinforce the power and values of the school authority and by extension particular values of patriarchy; the moral order takes primacy over clinical commitment.

Crucially, this casts somewhat new light on the relation of control, morality and emotions. As Fineman (2001) makes explicit, organizations assert control over their members through regulating the ‘right’ emotional responses (see Hochschild, 2003 [1983]), where the scope of affective display is limited to loyalty, both to the firm and to colleagues (Bauman, 1994). Emotional display can serve to stabilize or destabilize an organizational order. Subversive practices, in this regard, can as mentioned be similarly disturbing or non-disturbing. Indeed, to take up Bauman’s (1994) point here, the moral sentiment of challenging forms of control, whether through touching upon Christmas redundancies or the legitimacy of a putative authority figure, is to engage individual conscience in a way that does not ultimately benefit the organization. What this analysis highlights, though, is the role of authority figures such as managers for strategically determining which of these instances of rule-bending, often connected to emotional displays like indignation or humour, for instance, are considered to be threatening and therefore require sanction. However, from such a position of authority the public display of emotions such as anger or indignation can be used strategically in order to reinforce these arbitrary judgements attached to a mangers role as ‘moral arbitrator’. It is in this sense that the arbitrariness of judgement aligns with a given display of the manager in order to reduce any risk of undermining a performed self, to consistently manage and maintain such a display of ‘good’ management (Becker, 1960).

Just as importantly, while practices of subversion may be necessarily subject to different determinations of their legitimacy, perhaps according to the whims of those in a position of authority, the basis on which they are judged can serve to consistently reinforce deeper managerial ideologies. Returning to Kenny and Euchler’s (2012) case of the advertising firm, subversive humour was promoted to enhance a profitable organizational culture where ‘newness’ and innovation were prioritized. As long as these seemingly tasteless emails were not old, they were permissible. A rare conflict emerged when a director not so subtly implied that the emails of more lowly employed planners were as funny as ‘spam’ owing to their being often old and redundant. A junior planner, ‘JP’, expressing offense at this characterization was marginalized until he sent around a new joke that others found humourous. Kenny and Euchler link this emphasis on newness to Butler’s reading of the Lacanian real for showing the ‘groundlessness of the ground’ for morality in this context (Butler, 1997). However, such an account read through an interactionist standpoint reveals how it is exactly the groundlessness that plays into managerial strategies of control (see Munro, 1999), where it is specifically through transformation of uncertainty into certainty that the rendering of any action as subversive occurs as a practical accomplishment. In acting as moral arbitrators of acceptable subversion, the right to judgement and thus authority was reinforced, serving at once to accomplish and preserve an organizational order and the deeper ideologies underpinning it even as the practices within it were ‘ambiguous’ and always in the making.

What we make explicit here is the deep and often ironic interaction between morality, subversion and control. Power is derived from and reproduced by the consistent authority granted to determine what is and is not a form of subversion. It follows that the achievement of control associated with this right to moral judgement extends to, as well as shapes, the formal and informal ways an organization holds its members to be morally accountable. Subversive cultures premised on humour and parody become modes of work centring on the ability of managers to ensure that employees remain innovative and productive. Seemingly neutral authority structure and evaluations shift into strategic mechanism for those in power to reassert their personal control in the name of upholding a given morality. Hence, subversion can play an important role in reproducing and reaffirming organizational power relations and ideologies. In this regard, the accomplishing and preserving of an organization as ‘moral’ is in fact the reinforcing and reproduction of an existing managerial order. The grounds for subversive conduct shift according to whose interests such modes of conduct serve and so long as the legitimacy of authority is not challenged or tarnished as a consequence (see Bittner, 1967).

### Islamophobia

#### There’s nothing inherently revolutionary about Islam – it can be easily integrated into capitalism

Plummer ‘13 (BRENDA GAYLE, Merze Tate Professor of History @ U. of Wisconsin, Madison, *Journal of American Studies*, Volume 47.3, pp. 839-840)

Black Star, Crescent Moon could use less of the author's irritatingly essentialized appeals to the “Muslim International” and the “Muslim Third World.” While the author describes the former as “a parallel space to the state,” the “Muslim Third World” is never defined. It includes variously Saudi Arabia and the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, although neither of the two leading conference luminaries, Nehru and Zhou Enlai, were Muslims or represented Muslims. If the “Muslim International” and the “Muslim Third World” are meant to connote spaces of anti-imperialist popular resistance, the inclusion of certain polities is indeed puzzling. Are people who grew up in refugee camps or confront brutal Israeli apartheid policies to be conflated with those who secretly tipple fine scotch in Jeddah mansions? In reality there is no neat equation between Islam as currently practiced and anti-imperialism and antiracism. Just as Islam has been the principal religion in some revolutionary regimes that resisted domination, in other places it has proven compatible with slavery, racism, and exploitative capitalism, now as in the past. The same may be said for all of the “universal” religions. This work makes an important contribution in allowing readers to see beyond the intellectual ghetto to which much scholarship has consigned present-day Muslims. In so doing it ably dissects popular media representations. It ambitiously reaches beyond national borders to construct a picture of a global community of struggle. In the process, it arrives at important insights but often blurs these by indiscriminately associating all emancipatory impulses with Islam and by claiming insurgents who neither were Muslims nor were motivated by religious goals.

#### Contemporary Islamophobia is determined by capitalism – the aff may change labels but it just shifts the locus of oppression

Molyneux ‘8 (John, Marxist, “More than opium: Marxism and religion,” *International Socialism*, Issue: 119, http://isj.org.uk/more-than-opium-marxism-and-religion/)

Regardless of the merits or accuracy of the individual story or claim, and this is a particularly absurd one, the relentless flow of this kind of comment and coverage has turned Islam into a religion under siege. This incessant problematisation of Islam and demonisation of Muslims have created the phenomenon now widely referred to as Islamophobia.

For readers of this journal, it should be no mystery why this has occurred. It is not an expression of some visceral Christian hostility to Islam stretching back to the Crusades or the conflict with the Ottoman Empire (even though these atavisms are sometimes mobilised ideologically). It is because the majority of the people sitting on the world’s most important reserves of oil and natural gas happen to be Muslim and, secondarily, because, since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, much of these peoples’ resistance to imperialism has found expression in Islamist form. If the people of the Middle East and central Asia had been predominantly Buddhist or Tibet held oilfields comparable to those of Saudi Arabia or Iraq, we would now be dealing with “Buddhophobia”. Seeping out from the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA and Downing Street, coursing through the sewers of Fox News, CNN, the Sun and the Daily Mail would be the notion that, great religion though it undoubtedly was, there was some underlying and persistent flaw in Buddhism. “Intellectuals” such as Samuel Huntington, Christopher Hitchens and Martin Amis would be on hand to explain that, despite its embrace by naive hippies in the 1960s, Buddhism was an essentially reactionary creed characterised by its deepseated rejection of modernity and Western democratic values, and its fanatical commitment to feudalism, theocracy, misogyny and homophobia.

### Queer Atonality Link

#### The aff starts from a politics of queer atonality – a reduction of queerness to basic deviance that deprives it of moral or political force – instead, we should have a politics of queer communality that refuses the 1AC’s strong commitment to anti-normativity in favor of direct institutional transformation

Galloway ‘14 (Alexander, Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, “Queer Atonality,” http://cultureandcommunication.org/galloway/queer-atonality)

Rosenberg devotes much of her attention to queer theory’s “subjectless turn” and the shift toward what David Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Muñoz in 2005 called the “wide field of normalization.” Yet here the question is not so much a shift within queer theory, but a growing normalization--and a newfound trendiness perhaps--of the concept of queer in culture at large. Thus today any number of folks in straight relationships might still wish to label themselves “queer,” just as there is a growing trend to think about queer societies, queer animals, and indeed queer organisms, queer molecules, and queer ontologies. Rosenberg calls out Tim Morton's essay “Queer Ecology,” but the trend is wider than a single text can reveal, as evidenced by Karen Barad's work on “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” or the promulgation in other circles of what we might call a Queer-Deleuzian metaphysics.

Borrowing the concept of the "atonal" (atone) from Badiou's theory of points, it is possible to assign a name to the specific form of queerness that Rosenberg finds unnerving: queer atonality. By queer atonality we mean the notion that queerness can be abstracted to mean deviation as such, aleatoriness as such, or openness as such, and thus, through such extreme abstraction, queerness may be assigned as a proper monicker for biological and even ontological systems. In other words, if biology is that thing that works via difference and radical openness, then it is, by definition, queer. Or if ontology is a scenario of swerves and deviations, then it is, by definition, queer. As Rosenberg puts it, on the one hand “biology [is understood] as a kind of sheer queerness (or, aleatoriness),” and, on the other, matter “is coded as ontologically 'queer.'”

But “do we truly want to be unleashed into pure aleatoriness?” wonders Rosenberg. Such is the Pyrrhic victory of queer atonality: “If queerness is nothing but the productive force of matter, then why continue to call it queer?” As a deviation from normality, queerness has typically carried a kind of ethical or political force simply by virtue of intervening and resisting. We're here, we're queer demands acknowledgement, and thus a disruption of bourgeois morality. In this sense, queer means essentially "queering." As Nicholas de Villiers writes in his book on queer opacity, queering is a tactic aimed at appropriating, transforming, or deviating from a particular normative category. In this way, queer might have no ontological dimension per se, but rather might be defined as that thing unable to be integrated into existing symbolic economies, be they sexual or otherwise. But if today, following in the wake of the new queer metaphysics, matter and organic life themselves are queer, then the queer intervention becomes as atonal as anything else: the queerness of quantum superposition, the queerness of interspecies viral transfection, the queerness of non-carbon-based life forms. What started as a process of strategic intervention, has now congealed into a state of "sheer" queerness.

Further, ontologizing queerness produces a number of secondary effects, not all of which we can discuss here. One important additional issue though--and this parallels some of my previous commentary on Catherine Malabou, whose work I find tremendously useful--is what might be called the “morality conundrum.” In short: if ontology is pure aleatoriness and if ontology has no particular political or moral valence, then, barring the kind of unmitigated nihilism that makes all politics impossible, one is obligated to graft on a secondary moral theory to supplement the primary ontological one. Consider Malabou: if all is plasticity, then how can an individual judge good plasticity from bad plasticity? By what criterion may we assert, with confidence, that capitalist precarity (one form of plasticity) is odious, while neuronal adaptiveness (another form of plasticity) is not? Such is the curious irony of queer atonality. What began as a movement that, in part, sought to purge itself of the priggish prejudices of sexual moralism, and the bigotry and oppression that goes with it, must now author its own treatise on morality! Having been elevated to the level of being, queer theory must demonstrate its own deviation from being. Having been neutralized, queerness must now un-neutralize itself.

I follow this thread not to revel in futility, nor to expose queer theory to another kind of derision, now from the left rather than the right. Instead let's ask what we might gain from ontologizing queerness? And what we might lose?

Or to put the question another way: if there were a queering of ontology, what should it look like? I can think of two ways to address the question, one more negative and the other more affirmative. But there are certainly many other possible approaches suggested by others.

Response A: Viewed skeptically, queer ontology appears to be something of a contradiction in terms, simply because ontology itself is offensive and oppressive to queer life and identity. Ontology reproduces the very structure of queer alterity, given how ontology tends to be transcendental, abstracting, totalizing, and tied historically to concepts of hierarchy and morality, etc. “Ontology,” Frantz Fanon wrote in Black Skin, White Masks, “does not permit us to understand the being of the black man.” And thus, by homology, ontology does not permit us to understand the being of the queer.

This response seems absolutely valid and yet at the same time somewhat limiting. Absolutely valid--in the sense that metaphysics has often been used as a weapon against the poor, women, people of color, or anyone on the losing end of moral or metaphysical models of alterity. But also limiting--in the sense that ignoring such questions will not magically cause them to disappear; any theoretical undertaking, when pursued long enough, must come to terms with questions of being, appearing, and existing.

Indeed, ontology “does not permit”--as Fanon rightly said--but only when ontology is understood as representation or metaphysics. What if there were such a thing as a non-standard ontology? Could a non-standard ontology allow us to withdraw from structures of oppression? And could it facilitate such a withdrawal, while avoiding the problem of atonality and maintaining the many specificities of people's real culture and history?

Response B: This leads to a second response, one that I see as much more useful: a queer theory of ontology is indeed possible. But how would it look? It might not “look queer” in the aforementioned sense of queer atonality that Rosenberg calls into question, that is, an ontology rooted in aleatoriness, deviation, non-normativity, and so on. Such a new queer theory of ontology would not be queer per se--that's by design--but would be roomy enough for queerness, along with other forms of life and other kinds of being in the world.

Consider two different approaches. The first is a kind of hypertrophic instance of what, in theoretical circles, is called intersectionalism. We can understand such hypertrophic intersectionalism as a maximally heterogenous set of all forms of difference, brought into community without sacrificing the specificity and difference of all members of the set. This is not unlike how Hardt & Negri have defined the “multitude,” the multitude as capacious heterogeneity unmarked by homogenizing abstractions like “the masses” or “the people.” (It would take another blog post to demonstrate how the multitude is not simply a new form of queer atonality; but I think the argument can be made effectively.)

The second approach comes from a different angle. If intersectionalism is maximally heterogenous, a different approach also exists, the minimally heterogenous. Here, the community of alterity is defined not in terms of radical difference, but radical commonality. Similar to the concept of the “generic” in Laruelle or Badiou, I see a new potential for queer ontology to be understood in terms of radical equality via axiomatic exploration of the insufficiency of identity.

Indeed, Rosenberg links queerness to the concept of collectivity. This is the crucial step in my view. Summoning the allegorical style of Fredric Jameson, Rosenberg directs our attention not to “the subject per se, or 'the human,' but the collective.” And isn't this what materialism has always sought? “Surely the collective is that aleatory togetherness of which the ontological turn dreams.”

So, instead of queerness as the productive force of aleatory matter, we might pursue instead the concept of a “queer event” or the “event of queer collectivity.” I suspect that such an event would not follow some of the more familiar models from the past: event as deviation, difference, or alterity. Given that queer atonality is simply the macro form of such smaller deviations--the model of turbulence and churn described so well in Queer Deleuzianism--such theories of deviation have a limited utility. In addition, the queer event would most certainly not follow a productive or reproductive mandate; this being one of the most powerful discoveries of queer theory, that the queer body is not obligated to make anything. Instead we might explore the concept of a queer communism, or what Rosenberg simply labels the collectivity. This strikes me as particularly useful and urgent today.

In other words, Rosenberg's essay reveals that today's onto-primitivism is really a march toward proletarianization, which we might simply define as the bracketing of social collectivity in the name of material necessity. Such proletarianization must be identified as such, and resisted as frequently and as thoroughly as possible. Or as Rosenberg puts it, “Let it never be said of us that our consciousness was sheerly molecular, that we truly believed that all the baleful historical foreclosures of capitalism were ontologically true.”

Never believe that capitalism is ontologically true... This is, in essence, the first step toward exploring any form of collectivity. Queer atonality blocks such a movement, not because queerness has been fully co-opted and hence has nothing more to offer. On the contrary, the problem with queer ontology lies in ontology not queerness, for the standard model of ontology is one that is sufficient to itself and thus promulgates a structure of transcendental mastery, rational autonomy, and sufficiency for all. Queer communism, by contrast, resides in the making-insufficient of such philosophical structures. Queer communism reorients queerness away from deviation and alterity and toward the “weak” insufficiency of collectivity, a life lived in common with others, whosoever they may be.

### Race Link

#### Anti-capitalist demands for democratic transformation have dramatically improved black life in America. We need catered engagement with the state against capitalism, which is the root cause of contemporary violence, not anti-blackness

Johnson ‘16 (Cedric, Associate Prof. of African American Studies @ University of Illinois at Chicago, “An Open Letter to Ta-Nehisi Coates and the Liberals Who Love Him,” *Jacobin*, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/ta-nehisi-coates-case-for-reparations-bernie-sanders-racism/)

Perhaps aware of criticisms about the political feasibility of the reparations demand, Coates argues that the kind of social-democratic programs that Sanders has proposed are just as unlikely given the Republican Congress. But there is a significant difference between the two.

The left-egalitarian horizon is informed by a rich historical record of impactful reforms and has the capacity to unify broad swaths of the American middle and working class around their shared concerns — desire for a livable wage, economic security, housing, and education — while the reparations demand does not.

As it has evolved from the sixties, the reparations demand has never yielded one tangible improvement in the lives of the majority of African Americans. Though limited and historically uneven, the kinds of social-democratic reforms that are now being advanced by the Sanders campaign have had a discernible effect on the lives of the majority of African Americans at various points.

Ultimately, the historical narrative that underpins the reparations claim, a view of history that emphasizes racial conflict as primary, white supremacy as hegemonic and immutable, and black politics as insular and unitary, can only leave us with a fatalistic view of political possibilities that neglects the rich, diverse history of interracial left political struggle.

Contrary to the arguments offered by Coates and others, interracial social movements, universal social policy, and an expanded public sector created the contemporary black middle class as we know it.

Even as the slogan of white supremacy united various reactionary Southern elements and restored the power of the merchant-landlord class, interracial organizations fought to secure black freedom and create greater equality for black and white workers. The Readjuster Party in Virginia worked to unite workers against landed interests, and pressed for debt relief, lowered property taxes on farmers, chartered unions, established a black college, expanded public services, and removed the poll tax.

Other organizations at the end of the nineteenth century posed a different interracial, left vision of American society — organizations like the Populist Party of the 1890s, the Knights of Labor, and the Citizens Committee of New Orleans.

Throughout the twentieth century, struggles to expand labor rights, universal suffrage, and civil rights, and to abolish inequality, drew together diverse publics, creating concrete forms of social justice (albeit sometimes short-lived and imperfect). Whites who realized that their fates were intimately connected to those of southern blacks supported struggles against racism.

Jim Crow segregation — the historical system of racial apartheid that was legitimated at the federal level by Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine in 1896, codified by the states, and strictly enforced through violence and intimidation — began a long but certain death after the Second World War. While contemporary forms of inequality in wealth, housing, schooling, and criminal justice may bear a strong resemblance to Jim Crow, these injustices are classed in ways that the ascriptive status of blacks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were not.

Contemporary forms of oppression are not propelled by the need to subjugate black labor to the interests of Southern planters and industrialists, but as a means of managing a growing class of Americans who are not exclusively black but have been made obsolete by hyper-industrialization, the large-scale introduction of automation and cybernetic command, just-in-time production, and other strategies of flexible accumulation in US farms and factories.

We continue to reach for old modes of analysis in the face of a changed world, one where blackness is still derogated but anti-black racism is not the principal determinant of material conditions and economic mobility for many African Americans.

Social exclusion and labor exploitation are different problems, but they are never disconnected under capitalism. And both processes work to the advantage of capital. Segmented labor markets, ethnic rivalry, racism, sexism, xenophobia, and informalization all work against solidarity. Whether we are talking about antebellum slaves, immigrant strikebreakers, or undocumented migrant workers, it is clear that exclusion is often deployed to advance exploitation on terms that are most favorable to investor class interests.

In other words, the most impoverished and dispossessed are hyper-exploited, placing downward pressure on wage floors, worsening conditions and undermining worker power in specific sectors and throughout society. Liberal antiracist discourse further isolates the conditions of the most excluded segments of workers, separating their experiences from those of other workers, and their labor from the broader processes at work, instead of emphasizing the empirical and potential political unity of the laboring classes.

Respect for difference is valued in today’s multicultural milieu, but the mobilization of different sub-strata of the working class against one another has long been a cherished strategy of capital. In our own times, this has been a vaunted campaign strategy of the New Right since the presidential campaigns of Barry Goldwater, George Wallace, and Richard Nixon in the sixties.

Throughout that decade and into the early seventies, each man contributed to an ever more expansive repertoire of anti–civil rights and anti–New Left rhetoric, tugging the exposed, fraying threads of the New Deal coalition. In his bid for the Republican presidential nomination, Donald Trump has reached for the same playbook the New Right has used for decades, speaking in vile tones about the alleged criminality of Latino immigrants, talking openly about building a fence along the Mexican border, and calling for a US travel ban on all Muslims.

As it has in previous election cycles, such racist patter has resonated among some alienated white rural and suburban voters, and those in less populous states, who find it easier to bash minorities, the alleged liberal media, or left intellectuals than to contest the power that neoliberal politicians, multinational corporations, and the investor class wield over their lives.

Only in those historical moments when working-class and popular movements organize against these differences and around common predicaments and interests has society lurched toward greater equality. Many contemporary antiracist liberals have lost sight of this historical truth. And we will continue to lose if we follow their lead.

## Impact

### RC Race

#### Racialization is a device of advanced capitalism – producing ideological effects at the superstructure which in turn justify the operations at the economic base. Only a transformation to a post-capitalist society can create the possibility for racial liberation and their post-structural focus on race alone redirects attention away from the logic of capitalist exploitation.

Young 06 (Robert, Julius Silver Professor of English and Comparative Literature, “Putting Materialism back into Race Theory: Toward a Transformative Theory of Race”, <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/printversions/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm>, accessed 7/9/16)

This essay advances a materialist theory of race. In my view, race oppression dialectically intersects with the exploitative logic of advanced capitalism, a regime which deploys race in the interest of surplus accumulation. Thus, race operates at the (economic) base and therefore produces cultural and ideological effects at the superstructure; in turn, these effects—in very historically specific way—interact with and ideologically justify the operations at the economic base [1]. In a sense then, race encodes the totality of contemporary capitalist social relations, which is why race cuts across a range of seemingly disparate social sites in contemporary US society. For instance, one can mark race difference and its discriminatory effects in such diverse sites as health care, housing/real estate, education, law, job market, and many other social sites. However, unlike many commentators who engage race matters, I do not isolate these social sites and view race as a local problem, which would lead to reformist measures along the lines of either legal reform or a cultural-ideological battle to win the hearts and minds of people and thus keep the existing socio-economic arrangements intact; instead, I foreground the relationality of these sites within the exchange mechanism of multinational capitalism. Consequently, I believe, the eradication of race oppression also requires a totalizing political project: the transformation of existing capitalism—a system which produces difference (the racial/gender division of labor) and accompanying ideological narratives that justify the resulting social inequality. Hence, my project articulates a transformative theory of race—a theory that reclaims revolutionary class politics in the interests of contributing toward a post-racist society. In other words, the transformation from actually existing capitalism into socialism constitutes the condition of possibility for a post-racist society—a society free from racial and all other forms of oppression. By freedom, I do not simply mean a legal or cultural articulation of individual rights as proposed by bourgeois race theorists. Instead, I theorize freedom as a material effect of emancipated economic forms. I foreground my (materialist) understanding of race as a way to contest contemporary accounts of race, which erase any determinate connection to economics. For instance, humanism and poststructuralism represent two dominant views on race in the contemporary academy. Even though they articulate very different theoretical positions, they produce similar ideological effects: the suppression of economics. They collude in redirecting attention away from the logic of capitalist exploitation and point us to the cultural questions of sameness (humanism) or difference (poststructuralism). In developing my project, I critique the ideological assumptions of some exemplary instances of humanist and poststructuralist accounts of race, especially those accounts that also attempt to displace Marxism, and, in doing so, I foreground the historically determinate link between race and exploitation. It is this link that forms the core of what I am calling a transformative theory of race. The transformation of race from a sign of exploitation to one of democratic multiculturalism, ultimately, requires the transformation of capitalism.

### RC Asian American Affect

#### Capitalism structures racialized affects that cast Asian American into the position of the melancholic – desiring assimilation but perpetually and tragically other.

Santa Ana 15 (Jeffrey, Associate Professor of English at Stony Brook University, “Racial Feelings: Asian America in a Capitalist Culture of Emotion”, Temple University 2015, <http://www.temple.edu/tempress/chapters_1800/2342_ch1.pdf>, accessed 7/10/16)

Following Michael Omi and Howard Winant in their theory of racial formation, I want to emphasize that stereotypes of Asians as economic agents inform and express a racial ideology that has framed a "com-mon identity" for Asian Americans (89). State-based racial projects and initiatives have reinscribed and transformed racial ideology that forms Asian Americans as a race group, and Asian Americans have redefined the meaning of Asian American in their own racial projects and movements that reshape racial ideology. In the US capitalist system, racial feelings affect perceptions of Asians as racialized economic subjects that the state reinforces and alters as racial ideology and that Asian Americans rearticulate as both accommodation and resistance in their political movements and cultural works. But why are these emotions that play such a critical role in the racialization of Asian Americans specific to economics? And why have they formed Asian Americans as a race group by representing them as agents of finance capital? Critical analysts of capitalism have noted that this economic sys-tem uses, organizes, and generates human subjectivities to structure an emotional life that is consistent with preserving capitalist material interests and social relations. Karl Marx, for example, theorized capitalism as a system that engenders emotions, referring to his thesis that capitalist economics and the relations peculiar to upholding free enterprise are the foundation for all modern human institutions and organizations, including religion, which assembles beliefs, worldviews, and social norms into a culture of "spiritual production" (Marx and Engels, On Literature 14o). As Marx's concept of capitalism as "spiritual production" implies, capitalist economics are about the private ownership of the means of production and the accumulation of profit through the management and creation of feelings to maintain the capitalist system. Capitalism's emotional production is, according to Marx, hostile to other "branches of spiritual production, for example, art and poetry," which express the humanist ideals that inspire genuine artists (141). In coining the term spirit of capitalism to distinguish the attitudes and temperaments that favor the rational pursuit of economic gain and that were based on a Protestant ethics to engage in trade and accumulate wealth, Max Weber argued that religious practice fostered capitalism, and, despite reversing Marx's thesis, his argument further demonstrates the production of emotions (i.e., "spirit") in capitalist economics. As the economist Albert 0. Hirschman argued in his classic study of the drives and desires of self-interest that led to the rise of capitalism in eighteenth-century Europe, the pursuit of material interests through a market economy became understood as a social good in the Enlightenment era (63). Economic activities were seen to improve the self while channeling the unruly and destructive passions into "new ideological currents" that bolstered benign interests and developed positive feelings vital to sustaining civil order (63). For our current modern capitalist era, Eva Illouz has devised the term emotional capitalism to describe a contemporary social phenomenon in which emotions and economic practices mutually define and shape each other, producing a culture "in which affect is made an essential aspect of economic behavior and in which emotional life—especially that of the middle classes—follows the logic of economic relations and exchange" (5). Illouz's argument that a culture of emotional capitalism saturates today's popular media and determines economic discourses and activities is a compelling demonstration of the way modern capitalism structures human subjectivities and creates new feelings befitting a consumerist lifestyle predominating in liberal capitalist societies. As these critiques of capitalism and the emotions suggest, capitalist economics has created an enduring culture of feeling that affects racialized perception. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the United States, where Asians have been construed as agents of wealth and property acquisition. They have also been seen as threats to liberal democracy when they attempt to transcend their position as subjects of finance capital for white entitlement and privilege. A capitalist culture of emotion influences the way Americans have understood themselves on the basis of their desires, drives, and interests. It also affects how they've identified other people different from themselves, particularly those who come from another country, speak a foreign language, have a different skin color and physiognomy, and thus appear racially dissimilar. To understand why the racialization of Asian Americans has been and continues to be specific to economics, it is important to note that capital-ism structures human subjectivities and generates emotional values and cultures that influence perception. If, as Asian Americanist critics have argued, Americans have identified Asians through economic tropes as signs of globalization, this is because the capitalist production of racial feelings has been and continues to be central in reproducing discourses for norms, entitlements, and rights that uphold recognitions of person-hood and citizenship in liberal democracy.' These affectively charged discourses structure and maintain perceptions of Asians in America as economic subjects, forming them as a race group that falls outside the norms and social values traditionally determined by Euro-Americans.6 These norms and values have historically preserved and continue to sustain white entitlements to define subjectivity in liberal democratic capitalism. Two questions, then, guide this book: How do racial feelings in the historical and social contexts of US liberal democracy affect the perception of Asians both as economic exemplars and as threats? And how do Asian Americans in their own cultural works characterize, accommodate, and resist their discursive portrayal as economic subjects in a capitalist culture of emotion?